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INCOMPATIBLE THEORIES:
NATURAL LAW AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
MATrEI ION RADU*
[W]hoever hath an absolute Authority to interpret any written, or spoken
Laws; it is He, who is truly the Law-giver, to all Intents and Purposes; and
not the Person who first wrote, or spoke them.
-Bishop Benjamin Hoadly to King George I, 17171
I. INTRODUCTION
N 1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut,2 the United States Supreme Court
struck down a state ban on the use of contraceptives. 3 Griswold is gener-
ally regarded as the clear starting point for the return of the jurispruden-
tial doctrine of substantive due process "for [n]oneconomic [l]iberties."4
In that case, Justice Hugo Black dissented and accused the Court of engag-
ing in "natural law due process" legal reasoning. 5 Black considered this
mode of analysis akin to the Court's reasoning in its infamous decision in
Lochner v. New York,6 and he criticized the majority for engaging in such a
patently illicit form of judging.7
* Adjunct Professor, Villanova University; LL.M. Candidate, New York
University School of Law; M.A., London School of Economics; J.D., Villanova
University School of Law; B.A., Villanova University.
1. BENJAMIN LORD BISHOP OF BANGOR, THE NATURE OF THE KINGDOM, OR
CHURCH, OF CHRIST: A SERMON PREACH'D BEFORE THE KING AT THE ROYAL CHAPEL
AT ST. JAMES'S 12 (3d ed. 1717); see also Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review and
Interpretation: Have the Courts Become Sovereign when Interpreting the Constitution?, in
INSTITUTIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 116, 116 (Kermit L.
Hall & Kevin T. McGuire eds., 2005) (quoting Bishop Hoadly). For a discussion of
Bishop Hoadly, see Edwin R. Bingham, The Political Apprenticeship of Benjamin
Hoadly, 16 CHURCH HIsT. 154 (1947).
2. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3. See id. at 485-86.
4. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 544
(15th ed. 2004). For an overview of the concept of substantive due process in the
history of the Court, see EDWARD KEYNES, LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND PRIVACY: TOWARD
A JURISPRUDENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS (1996); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE
RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO
JUDGE-MADE LAW 148-63 (1986).
5. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 511 n.3 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing thatJustice
White's interpretation goes even further than "past pronouncements of the natu-
ral law due process theory").
6. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
7. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 514-15 (Black, J., dissenting) (asserting that Lochner
supported majority's decision even though majority failed to cite it); ROBERT P.
GEORGE, THE CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES: LAW, RELIGION, AND MORALITY IN CRISIS 171
(2001) [hereinafter GEORGE, THE CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES] (discussing Black's be-
(247)
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While Black is certainly not alone in regarding them as synonymous,
the more than forty years since Griswold have shown that there are, in fact,
important differences between substantive due process theory and natural
law philosophy.8 Most traditional natural law thinkers agree that the
Court's conclusions in the substantive due process decisions were morally
incorrect, in the sense that the Court's judgments granted constitutional
protection to practices that the natural law jurisprudes regard as morally
evil.9 Among those same theorists, however, there is wide disagreement as
to what the proper natural law response in those cases would have been.
10
Specifically, they have engaged in a long-running debate about whether
justices may look to the natural law in reaching their decisions.11
For the purposes of this Article, a good working definition of "sub-
stantive due process" is provided by Chief Justice Rehnquist in the 1997
case of Washington v. Glucksberg.12 Substantive due process is the belief
that "[t] he Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the
'liberty' it protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint."1 3
In a separate case, the Court stated that the Due Process Clause "protects
individual liberty against 'certain government actions regardless of the
fairness of the procedures used to implement them."' 14 Additionally, the
Court has averred that "[t]he Clause . . . provides heightened protection
against government interference with certain fundamental rights and lib-
erty interests. 1 5 Substantive due process can also be understood as the
lief that "natural law" basis of Griswold decision was enough to establish Griswolds
"incorrectness").
8. See, e.g., Hadley Arkes, Lochner v. New York and the Cast of Our Laws, in
GREAT CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 94, 96 (Robert P. George ed., 2000); Christo-
pher Wolfe, Judicial Review, in NATURAL LAw ANn CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC POLICY
157, 164-65 (David F. Forte ed., 1998); William Cohen, Justices Black and Douglas
and the "Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula": Some Fragments of Intellectual History, 20
U.C. DAviS L. REv. 381 (1987); Kenneth L. Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice
Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula, "16 UCLA L. REv. 716
(1969).
9. See, e.g., Charles E. Rice, Abortion, Euthanasia, and the Need to Build a New
"Culture of Life," 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 497 (1998) (discussing
repercussions of Roe v. Wade, which declared prohibitions on abortions
unconstitutional).
10. See, e.g., Hadley Arkes, Russell Hittinger, William Bentley Ball & Robert H.
Bork, Natural Law and the Law: An Exchange, FIRST THINGS, May 1992, at 45, availa-
ble at http://www.firstthings.com/article.php3?idarticle=5875 (discussing view-
points of four leading natural law scholars on relationship between natural law and
Constitution).
11. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SE-
DUCTION OF THE LAw (1990) [hereinafter BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA];
GEORGE, THE CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES, supra note 7, at 178-83; HARRY V. JAFFA,
STORM OVER THE CONSTITUTION 39-43 (1999).
12. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
13. Id. at 719.
14. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (quoting Dan-
iels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
15. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
[Vol. 54: p. 247
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theory whereby the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments "impose substantive requirements on statutes." 16
This Article begins with a review of the central cases of the substantive
due process corpus. It then presents the philosophical preconceptions
that are at work in those decisions, such as how the Court views the human
being, the highest good, moral truth, and the political community. There-
after, this Article offers a natural law critique of the results in the substan-
tive due process cases to illustrate the chasm that exists between the
substantive due process and natural law theories. Finally, this Article ex-
plores the divergence of natural law opinions on whether the natural law
may be used in adjudicating federal constitutional cases, and offers the
author's thoughts on this important intra-theory question.
II. THE RISE, FALL, AND RETURN OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Lochner v. New York marked the clear beginning of the Court's foray
into the oxymoronic field of substantive due process reasoning, although
previous cases had suggested that the Court might move in that direc-
tion. 17 In Lochner, the state of New York enacted a statute limiting the
amount of hours bakery employees could work to sixty hours per week or
ten hours per day. 18 The defendant was a bakery owner who allowed one
of his workers to log more hours than the maximum amount permitted by
the statute.' 9
In an opinion by Justice Rufus Peckham, the Court struck down New
York's "labor law" for violating the fundamental right to contract. 20 De-
spite the lack of explicit language in the amendment, the Court found a
right to contract in the Fourteenth Amendment: "Under that provision no
state can deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due pro-
cess of law. The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty
protected by this amendment, unless there are circumstances which ex-
16. ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 69
(2003) [hereinafter BORK, COERCING VIRTUE].
17. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (striking down statute
prohibiting dealings with noncompliant marine insurance companies on due pro-
cess grounds); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (holding that statute prohib-
iting manufacture or sale of liquor does not deprive persons of property without
due process of law); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) (upholding statute regu-
lating warehousing business on grounds that it did not "deprive persons of their
property without due process of law"). For a discussion of substantive due process
as an oxymoron, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUsT: A THEORY OFJUDI-
CIAL REvIEw 18 (1980) ("[T]here is simply no avoiding the fact that the word that
follows 'due' is 'process.' . . . '[S]ubstantive due process' is a contradiction in
terms-sort of like 'green pastel redness.' ").
18. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 46 (1905) (discussing New York
statute).
19. See id. at 45-47 (describing defendant's violation of statute).
20. See id. at 64-65 (dismissing plaintiffs contention that statute affected em-
ployees' health, and holding that right to contract cannot be infringed upon with-
out violating Constitution).
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clude the right."2 1 After recognizing this right, the Court applied a
means/ends balancing test, considering whether the state's justification
for abridging the right was sufficient and, if so, whether the state chose the
proper means for achieving its end. 22 Though the decision was ultimately
discredited, this framework by which Lochner analyzed the due process
claim remains good law.
23
The thirty years following Lochner constituted an era of substantive
due process restrictions on state economic regulations. During this time,
the Court struck down numerous economic regulations on the grounds
that they violated the principles and strict analytical requirements set forth
in Lochner.2 4 For example, in Adkins v. Children's Hospital of the District of
Columbia,2 5 the Court invalidated, on due process grounds, a D.C. statute
that mandated minimum wages for female employees.
26
The Lochner era came to a close in the 1930s, however. 2 7 Beginning
with Newbie v. New York, 28 the Court employed a lighter standard of review
for economic regulations than that articulated in Lochner.29 In Newbie, the
Court acknowledged that it was wrong in Lochner to place individual con-
tract rights over a state's ability to govern.3 0 The Court also announced
that it would no longer second-guess the substantive policy decisions of
21. Id. at 53.
22. See id. at 56-57 (describing issue as whether state act is reasonable exercise
of police power or whether it unnecessarily interferes with individual's liberty).
23. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., con-
curring) ("'Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the
State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compel-
ling"' (quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960))). For an
argument that, at least in certain respects, Lochner is still very much a part of our
constitutional law, see Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873,
875 (1987) ("Numerous decisions depend in whole or in part on common law
baselines or understandings of inaction and neutrality that owe their origin to
Lochner-like understandings."). Sunstein's argument, however, has been chal-
lenged. See generally David E. Bernstein, Lochner's Legacy's Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REv. 1
(2003) (refuting Sunstein's historical claims).
24. See MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS, THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND REALITY: SUB-
STANTIVE DUE PROCESS FROM THE 1890S TO THE 1930s 41 (2001) (noting that fifty-
six cases constitute "core of Lochner-era due process"); David E. Bernstein, Lochner
Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutional-
ism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 46-50 (2003) (discussing expansion of Lochner).
25. 261 U.S. 525 (1923), abrogated by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937).
26. See id. at 539, 562 (explaining statute in question and stating Court's
holding).
27. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE
OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 192-93 (1993) (discussing cessa-
tion of Court's use of Lochner as conceptual framework for evaluating legislation).
28. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
29. See id. at 525 (stating that "the guaranty of due process.., demands only
that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be
attained").
30. See id. at 538.
[Vol. 54: p. 247
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the legislature.3 1 Next, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish3 2 the Court further
retreated from the heady days of Lochner-style substantive due process rea-
soning."-"' In West Coast Hotel, the Court stated frankly:
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It
speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without
due process of law. In prohibiting that deprivation, the Constitu-
tion does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable lib-
erty.... Liberty under the Constitution is... necessarily subject
to the restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasona-
ble in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the
community is due process.3 4
For almost three decades, with few exceptions, this spirit of judicial
restraint controlled in the area of due process adjudication. 35 In Griswold,
however, the Court introduced a powerful new form of substantive due
process, which focused on noneconomic liberties.36 Because the state
rarely enforced the anti-contraception law at issue in the case, Robert Bork
opines that Griswold "was insignificant in itself but momentous for the fi-
ture of constitutional law."3 7
A. Contraception
The statute contested in Griswold was Connecticut's longstanding law
proscribing the use of contraceptives, even by married people. 38 The de-
31. See id. at 537-38.
32. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
33. See id. at 400 (overruling Adkins, which relied on Lochner); see also GEORGE,
THE CLASHi OF ORTHODOXIES, supra note 7, at 343 n.21 (noting that most commen-
tators view West Coast Hotel as implicitly overruling Lochner).
34. West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 391.
35. See Skinner v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 539-41 (1942) (ac-
knowledging that state laws are owed "large deference"); United States v. Carolene
Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) (deferring to legislative judgment and uphold-
ing statute regulating milk products). In Carolene Products, Justice Stone indicated
that certain types of legislation may deserve heightened scrutiny by the Court. See
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4.
36. See generally JOHN W. JOHNSON, GRISWOLD V. CONNE;FICUT BIRTH CON-
TROL AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY (2005); see also Randy E. Barnett,
Foreword: What's So Wicked About Lochner?, ] N.Y.U.J.L. & LIBER-IY 325, 328 (2005).
37. See BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 95; see also Lackland
H. Bloom,Jr., The Legacy ofGriswold, 16 Omo N.U. L. REv. 511, 511 (1989) (dem-
onstrating significance of Griswold); Louis H. Pollak, Keynote, "Liberty": Enumerated
Rights? Unenumerated Rights? Penumbral Rights? Other?, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 905, 908
(2006) (recognizing importance of holding in Griswold without "vouching for the
Court's opinion"); Patrick A. Shrake, Comment, Griswold at 40: The State's Compel-
ling Interest in Banning Contraceptives, 2 U. ST. THo.MAS L.J. 475, 477-80 (2005) (dis-
cussing influence of Griswold on subsequent cases).
38. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965) (describing Con-
necticut statute at issue). For useful information about the anti-contraception stat-
utes of Connecticut and other states, see Russell Hittinger, Abortion Before Roe,
5
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fendants held various positions with the Planned Parenthood League of
Connecticut.3 9 After disseminating information on contraception to mar-
ried couples, the defendants were each fined $100.40 There is evidence
that the defendants intentionally sought this criminal sanction in order to
enlist the Court's help in advancing their cultural and moral views.
4 1
Notably, Justice William Douglas began the Court's analysis in Gris-
wold by expressly denying that the majority followed Lochner in reaching its
conclusion. 42 Instead, the Court's decision rested on the discovery of a
general constitutional right to privacy that invalidated the anti-contracep-
tion statute.43 As the opinion explained, "specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of pri-
vacy. . . . [T] he right of privacy which presses for recognition here is a
legitimate one."4 4 Thus, the majority opinion found a right to privacy
generally associated with the first ten amendments of the Constitution.
45
This larger right to privacy protects the marriage relationship and includes
a married couple's right to use contraceptives. 4 6 The Court held the Con-
necticut statute unconstitutional because the proscription on contracep-
tive use had "a maximum destructive impact upon" marriage.
47
Several concurrences further illuminated the thinking and rationale
of the justices who revived the doctrine of substantive due process. In a
concurrence joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, Justice
Goldberg stated that "the right of privacy in the marital relation is funda-
FIRST THINGS, Oct. 1994, at 14, available at http://www.firstthings.com/article.php
3?idarticle=4494.
39. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480 (identifying one defendant as Executive Di-
rector of Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and other defendant as
Medical Director for League's New Haven Center).
40. See id. (noting that defendants were convicted as accessories because they
counseled married persons about ways to prevent conception).
41. See BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 95-97; GEORGE, THE
CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES, supra note 7, at 341 n.18, 34243 n.21.
42. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-82 (declining to follow Lochner and claiming
to remain consistent with Court's opinions in several other substantive due process
cases). Douglas asserted, "We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the
wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business af-
fairs, or social conditions." Id. at 482.
43. See id. at 484-86.
44. Id. at 484-85 (citations omitted).
45. See id. at 484-86.
46. See id. at 485 (concluding that marital relationships fall "within the zone
of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees").
47. See id. at 485-86 (asserting that idea of allowing police to search "sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms" is "repulsive"). Ironically, at least one scholar con-
cludes that the widespread availability of effective contraceptives played a signifi-
cant role in the dramatic increase in the divorce rate between 1965 and 1975. See
Robert T. Michael, Why Did the U.S. Divorce Rate Double Within a Decade?, in 6 RE-
SEARCH IN POPULATION ECONOMICS 367, 367-99 (T. Paul Schultz ed., 1988); see also
George A. Akerlof, Men Without Children, 108 ECON. J. 287, 288 (1998) (arguing
that contraception had detrimental effect upon institution of marriage).
[Vol. 54: p. 247
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mental and basic-a personal right 'retained by the people' within the
meaning of the Ninth Amendment .... [This right] is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment from infringement by the States."48 Justice
Harlan contended that the anti-contraception law ran afoul of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it "violate[d] basic
values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."49
Although Griswold is the first case in which the Court recognized a
constitutional right to privacy, Michael Sandel argues that the case is not a
"dramatic constitutional departure."5 0 Sandel states that the privacy right
that Griswold proclaimed "is consistent with traditional notions of privacy
going back to the turn of the century"; importantly "the Court vindicated
privacy not for the sake of letting people lead their sexual lives as they
choose, but rather for the sake of affirming and protecting the social insti-
tution of marriage.15 1 Rather than Griswold, Sandel points to the 1972
case of Eisenstadt v. Baird52 as the more significant case "[f] rom the stand-
point of shifting privacy conceptions."
53
Though technically an Equal Protection case, Eisenstadt revealed the
considerable size of the right to privacy announced in Griswold.54 Essen-
tial to the rationale of the Griswold majority was the fact that the state anti-
contraception statute applied to married persons.55 While the Court in
48. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
49. See id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)). On
the other hand,Justice White's reasons for striking down the statute were far more
practical: he did not believe the law served Connecticut's stated purpose of limit-
ing "all forms of promiscuous or illicit sexual relationships." See id. at 505 (White,
J., concurring) (arguing that Connecticut had not explained how "ban on the use
of contraceptives by married couples in any way reinforces [Connecticut's] ban on
illicit sexual relationships").
50. See MICHAELJ. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 97 (1996); see also William Van Alstyne, Closing the Circle of Con-
stitutional Review From Griswold v. Connecticut to Roe v. Wade: An Outline of a Deci-
sion Merely Overruling Roe, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1677, 1678-84 (1989) (arguing that
substantial difference exists between Giswold and Roe).
51. SANDEL, supra note 50, at 96-97.
52. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
53. See SANDEL, supra note 50, at 97.
54. See id.
55. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); see also Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in
question inhered in the marital relationship."). Waxing eloquent in the Griswold
majority opinion, Justice Douglas claimed that:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the
degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life,
not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a pur-
pose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Id. It is fair to say that Douglas's words contrast rather sharply with his own per-
sonal conduct with regards to marriage. See Richard A. Posner, The Anti-Hero, THE
7
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Griswold held only that the Constitution protects married couples' use of
contraception, the Court in Eisenstadt extended this right to contraception
to unmarried couples as well, holding unconstitutional a law requiring
that the distribution of contraceptives be limited to married persons. 56
Justice Brennan's majority opinion rested on the assertion that "whatever
the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights
must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike."' 57 The major-
ity interpreted Griswolds right to privacy in very broad terms: "If the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or sin-
gle, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child." 58 Importantly, after Eisenstadt, the right to privacy had as its justi-
fication the inviolability of individual desires, not the protection of mar-
riage or other fundamental human institutions. 59
B. Abortion
The impact of the theoretical shift between Griswold and Eisenstadt is
clearly visible in the Court's next big substantive due process case: Roe v.
Wade.60 Roe struck down Texas's anti-abortion statute and, along with the
companion case of Doe v. Bolton,6 1 set forth the framework by which any
future abortion regulation would be judged.62 The Roe standard prohib-
ited states from banning or severely restricting abortion. 63 Under the
Court's pronouncement, state regulations adversely affecting a woman's
ability to obtain a surgical abortion were to be strictly scrutinized. 64
In the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun offered a review of various
"right of privacy" cases. 65 He then concluded:
NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 24, 2003, at 27 (revealing that "Douglas was a compulsive wom-
anizer.., a terrible husband to each of his four wives [and] a terrible father to his
two children").
56. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-55 (acknowledging that "under Griswold the
distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited," and con-
cluding that separate treatment of married and unmarried persons violates Equal
Protection Clause).
57. Id. at 453.
58. Id.
59. See BoRx, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 111.
60. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Archival evidence now suggests that Eisenstadt was
consciously written in a way that would justify the Court's conclusion in Roe. See
William Saletan, Unbecoming Justice Blackmun, LEGAL AFF., May/June 2005, available
at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/May-June-2005/feature-saleton-mayjunO5.
msp.
61. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
62. See Doe, 410 U.S. at 179; Roe, 410 U.S. at 113. For the status of anti-abor-
tion laws, and efforts to repeal them, between the end of the Second World War
and Roe, see JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY
585-672 (2006).
63. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155, 164-65.
64. See id. at 155-56.
65. See id. at 152-53.
[Vol. 54: p. 247
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This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined,
in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy. 66
Though it claimed that it "need not resolve the difficult question of when
life begins," the Court in fact did decide that the pre-born human was not
a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 7 Ulti-
mately, however, the majority concluded that neither the state's nor the
woman's interest in the abortion question is absolute. 68 This determina-
tion allowed Blackmun to set up the famous trimester scheme for abortion
adjudication. 69 Blackmun's system provided that:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first tri-
mester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to
the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending
physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the
first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of
the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure
in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting
its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses,
regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is neces-
sary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of
the life or health of the mother.
70
While Roe allowed for increased restrictions on abortion later in the
pregnancy, states that tried to actualize this potential regulatory ability
often found themselves at odds with Doe.7 1 Doe permitted a postviability
abortion for sufficient health reasons and, significantly, the Court defined
health broadly: "We agree with the District Court that the medical judg-
ment may be exercised in the light of all factors-physical, emotional, psy-
chological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being of
the patient. All these factors may relate to health." 72 Charles Rice submits
66. Id. at 153.
67. See id. at 156-59.
68. See id. at 154.
69. See id. at 164-65.
70. Id.
71. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191-92 (1973).
72. Id. at 192 (citation omitted).
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that the de facto effect of Roe and Doe was "a sanction for permissive abor-
tion at every stage of pregnancy." 73
Roe created a firestorm of controversy.7 4 Since its disposition, the
case has been criticized on substantive, legal, and historical grounds. 75
Opponents of Roe charge that the decision deprived pre-born humans le-
gal protection from lethal force and that it illegitimately removed from
the democratically elected state legislatures the important question of
abortion policy. 76 By the early 1990s, a legitimate question existed as to
whether the Court would retain Roe.77 In 1992, in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,78 the Court provided an answer that it
hoped would be dispositive. 79
In Casey, the Court considered the constitutionality of a number of
Pennsylvania's abortion regulations. Though it found a majority of these
statutory provisions valid, Casey was not the victory that anti-abortion forces
had sought. The Court upheld the core ruling of Roe, that a woman's
right to procure an abortion is a fundamental right under the Constitu-
tion's Fourteenth Amendment.8 0 To justify this conclusion, the plurality
opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter contended that:
[The Court's] obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to
mandate our own moral code. Our law affords constitutional
protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procrea-
73. See CHARLES E. RICE, THE WINNING SIDE: QUESTIONS ON LIVING THE CUu
TURE OF LIFE 15 (1999) [hereinafter RICE, THE WINNING SIDE]. In the wake of its
ruling in Roe, the Court struck down a number of state abortion regulations. See,
e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983);
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Miss. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
74. See generally THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY: 25 YEARS AFTER ROE V. WADE
(Louis Pojman & FrancisJ. Beckwith eds., 1998).
75. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973);John Keown, Back to the Future of Abortion Law: Roe's
Rqection of America's Histoy and Traditions, 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 3 (2006); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
995 (2003). Even those who agree with the result of Roe admit that Justice Black-
mun's opinion was flawed. See, e.g., WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE
NATION'S Top LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION
(Jack Balkin ed., 2005).
76. See CHARLES E. RICE, FIFTY QUESTIONS ON THE NATURAL LAw: WHAT IT IS
AND WHY WE NEED IT 121 (1999) [hereinafter RICE, FIrT QUESTIONS]; see also RoB-
ERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TowARDs GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN
DECLINE 173-74 (1996) [hereinafter BORK, SLOUCHING].
77. See, e.g., Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing
for an Audience of One, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 119, 120 (1989); Charles F. Rice, Implica-
tions of the Coming Retreat from Roe v. Wade, 4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1
(1988).
78. 505. U.S. 833 (1992).
79. See id. at 844-46; Russell Hittinger, When the Court Should Not Be Obeyed,
FIRST THINGS, Oct. 1993, at 12, available at http://www.firstthings.com/article.php
3?idarticle=5169.
80. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 844-71.
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tion, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and edu-
cation. Our cases recognize "the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."... These matters, involving the
most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a life-
time, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are cen-
tral to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At
the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the at-
tributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of
the State. 8 '
The Court did make some changes to the constitutional right to ob-
tain an abortion, however.8 2 After Casey, instead of this right being
grounded in the right to privacy, the right to abortion was a "liberty inter-
est" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 83 Just as Eisenstadt broad-
ened the right to privacy first announced in Griswold, the concept of
"liberty as conceived in Casey is broader than privacy as conceived in
Roe."84 Erin Daly of Widener University contends:
Abortion as privacy, for instance, means that women are pro-
tected against governmental intrusion but can make no claim to
governmental assistance. Abortion as a liberty issue, on the other
hand, permits a broader understanding of abortion that more
accurately reflects the multiple meanings of reproductive
rights.... By identifying abortion as part of a more general lib-
erty interest, the Court raised the stature of the abortion deci-
sion, at least by implication.
85
Additionally, the Court rejected Roe's standard of strict scrutiny, pro-
viding instead that state regulations of abortion are constitutionally valid
so long as they do not place an undue burden on a woman seeking a
surgical abortion. 86 While the exact meaning of the undue burden stan-
dard is difficult to ascertain, several of the contested Pennsylvania restric-
81. Id. at 850-51 (citations omitted). This passage has been frequently criti-
cized. See, e.g., BORK, COERCING VIRTUE, supra note 16, at 71-72; JAMES V. SCIHALL,
ROMAN CATHOLIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 48-50 (2004); Edward Whelan, The Meta-
Nonsense of Lawrence, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 133 (2006), http://www.the
pocketpart.org/2006/06/whelan.html.
82. See Kelly Sue Henry, Note, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey: The Reaffirmation of Roe or the Beginning of the End?, 32 U. Louis-
VILLEJ. FAM. L. 93 (1993-1994).
83. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846-53.
84. Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the New Rhetoric
of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 A M. U. L. REv. 77, 121-22 (1995).
85. Id. at 122.
86. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
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tions in Casey were held constitutional under the undue burden standard,
whereas they would have been invalidated under Roe's standard of strict
scrutiny.8 7 Thus, while Casey may have theoretically broadened the abor-
tion right by terming it a "liberty interest," the effective result of the case
was a narrowing of that right because states are now allowed to place more
restrictions on abortion than under Roe.88
C. Homosexual Conduct
The reach of the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence is not
limited to matters concerning contraception and abortion, but also covers
claims about human sexuality.8 9 In Bowers v. Hardwick,90 the Court upheld
the right of states to outlaw homosexual sodomy.9' The majority opinion,
authored by Justice White, held that homosexuals did not have a funda-
mental right to participate in acts of sodomy within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process.92 Justice White went
so far as to assert that the challenger was unable to show any connection
between homosexual conduct and "family, marriage, or procreation,"
which were the matters granted protection in the previous substantive due
process cases.
9 3
In concluding that there is no fundamental right to engage in homo-
sexual conduct, the majority took notice of the strong history of anti-sod-
omy laws in the United States, stating: "Against this background, to claim
that a right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at
best, facetious." 94 Furthermore, Justice White expressed an unwillingness
to announce new substantive rights that lacked textual support in the Con-
stitution.9 5 The majority found unconvincing the fact that the statute in-
87. See id. at 911-22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. See STEPHEN P. POWERS AND STANLEY ROTHMAN, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH?: CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL AcTivisM 26 (2002); Erwin Chemerinsky, Is
the Rehnquist Court Really that Conservative?: An Analysis of the 1991-92 Term, 26
CREIGHTON L. REiv. 987, 1001 (1993) ("[After Casey,] states will have some lati-
tude-maybe even great latitude-in regulating abortions.... ."); Brent Weinstein,
The State's Constitutional Power to Regulate Abortion, 14J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 229
(2004).
89. See Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial
Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1555 (2004).
90. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
91. See id. at 196. An active homosexual challenged the Georgia statute. See
id. at 188. Though the law proscribed both homosexual and heterosexual sodomy,
the Court noted that "[the] only claim properly before the Court . . . is [the]
challenge to the Georgia statute as applied to consensual homosexual sodomy.
[The Court] express[es] no opinion on the constitutionality of the Georgia statute
as applied to other acts of sodomy." Id. at 188 n.2.
92. See id. at 191-96.
93. See id. at 191.
94. Id. at 194.
95. See id. at 194-95.
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terfered with actions that took place within the confines of the
challenger's house, as "illegal conduct is not always immunized whenever
it occurs in the home."96 Importantly, the Court found that, by itself, mo-
rality could provide the justification needed to pass rational basis review.' 7
Seventeen years later, in Lawrence v. Texas,98 the Court completely
turned around: it overruled Bowers and struck down a state statute that
criminalized homosexual, but not heterosexual, sodomy.9" While the de-
cision may not have had a considerable immediate effect-only thirteen
states still had any sort of anti-sodomy laws on the books and these were
infrequently enforced-the broad language employed by the Court sug-
gests wide-ranging societal consequences.' 0 0
The Lawrence majority, written by Justice Kennedy, held that the
state's anti-homosexual sodomy law invalidly infringed upon the defen-
dant's substantive due process rights.'' The Court asserted that there was
"an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertain-
ing to sex." 10 2 Justice Kennedy charged that:
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The
State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to lib-
erty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to
engage in their conduct without intervention of the
government. 103
Quite surprisingly, considering the strong historical pedigree of anti-sod-
omy laws, as evidenced in Bowers, the Court in Lawrence concluded that
"[t] he Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify
96. Id. at 195.
97. See id. at 196. ("The law, however, is constantly based on notions of moral-
ity, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated
under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.").
98. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
99. See id. at 578.
100. See, e.g., W. Todd Akin, Debunking "Conservative" Arguments Against the Fed-
eral Marriage Amendment, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 219 (2004);
Sarah Catherine Mowchan, Note, A Supreme Court that is "Willing to Start Down that
Road". The Slippery Slope of Lawrence v. Texas, 17 REGENT U. L. REx'. 125 (2004-
2005) (considering impact of Lawrence). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Liberty After Law-
rence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1059 (2004); Charles E. Mauney, Jr., Comment, Landmark
Decision or Limited Precedent: Does Lawrence v. Texas Require Recognition of a Funda-
mental Right to Same-Sex Marriage?, 35 CUMB. L. REV. 147, 147-48 (2004-2005) (con-
tending that "the suggestion that Lawrence requires recognition of a federal
fundamental right to same-sex marriage is based on an overly broad reading of
Lawrence.").
101. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
102. Id. at 572.
103. Id. at 578.
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its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual." 10 4 Thus,
the majority found that the anti-sodomy law did not even pass the minimal
judicial standard of rational basis review. 10 5
Passages from Lawrence also suggest that, in direct contrast to Bowers,
morality alone is no longer a sufficient justification for a statute. 10 6 Some
harm is required before a practice may be criminalized, not mere moral
condemnation by the community. 10 7 The Court's adherence in Lawrence
to the no (physical) harm principle contrasts rather sharply with, for ex-
ample, Justice Goldberg's assertion in his Griswold concurrence that "pro-
tecting marital fidelity" and preventing "sexual promiscuity" were
legitimate state goals.t°8 Nevertheless, possibly in anticipation of criticism,
Justice Kennedy was careful to point out to what conduct the Lawrence
ruling did not apply. 10 9
D. Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide
Since 1990, the Court has had several opportunities to examine end-
of-life matters through the scope of substantive due process. 110 In Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, "1I the Court rejected a claim that a
state's refusal to remove the feeding tube of a woman in a persistent vege-
tative state violated the woman's substantive due process rights.' 12 In
Cruzan, the parents of an injured woman took legal action to discontinue
her life-sustaining treatment because she "would not wish to continue on
with her nutrition and hydration." 113 The Supreme Court of Missouri
held that the requisite "clear and convincing" standard of evidence to
prove that key fact was not met."1
4
104. Id. Justice Kennedy challenged some of the historical findings ofJustice
White in Bowers. See id. at 559.
105. See id. at 578.
106. See id. at 577-78.
107. See id.
108. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
109. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. The Court claimed that:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons
who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships
where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public
conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual per-
sons seek to enter.
Id.
110. SeeJohn T. Noonan,Jr., Dealing With Death, Speech atJ. Phillip Clarke
Family Lectures in Medical Ethics (Mar. 20, 1998), in 12 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'y 387 (1998); EmilyJ. Sovell, Elderly, Be Alert: The Battle Continues Over
Deathbed ights, 45 S.D. L. Rzv. 670 (2000).
111. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
112. See id. at 286-87.
113. See id. at 268.
114. See id. at 268-69.
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ChiefJustice Rehnquist's majority opinion affirmed the ruling of Mis-
souri's highest court.'1 5 The Court "conclude [d] that a State may apply a
clear and convincing evidence standard in proceedings where a guardian
seeks to discontinue nutrition and hydration of a person diagnosed to be
in a persistent vegetative state." 1 6 It is important to note, however, the
narrow scope of the Cruzan holding: "For purposes of this case, it is as-
sumed that a competent person would have a constitutionally protected
right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition." 117 Thus, if a state so
chose, it could require a lesser evidentiary standard or no standard at all
for the cessation of life-sustaining treatment for a mentally incompetent
person.IIs
In 1997, in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court upheld a state statute
proscribing assisted suicide against a substantive due process challenge.1 19
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that suicide
goes against the tradition of the country. 120 He asserted that the Court's
precedents neither created nor supported the purported right to sui-
cide. 12 1 Therefore, the majority concluded that the right to suicide was
"not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause."1 22 Furthermore, as the state law was "rationally related to [a] le-
gitimate government interes[t]," it met rational basis review.123 While
Glucksberg clearly upheld the right of states to ban assisted suicide, the
Court said nothing about the constitutional status of a potential statute
permitting the practice. 12 4
III. THE PHILOSOPHY OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
There is no uniform statement of what substantive due process is or
what it requires. 125 This reflects both the truth that the law in this area is
continuously evolving and the fact that different justices wrote the opin-
ions, each of whom had a particular view on the topic. Nevertheless, one
115. See id. at 286-87.
116. Id. at 284.
117. Id. at 262.
118. For an analysis of the meaning and impact of Cruzan, see Edward R.
Grant & Cathleen A. Cleaver, A Line Less Reasonable: Cruzan and the Looming Debate
Over Active Euthanasia, 2 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 99 (1991).
119. See 521 U.S. 702, 736 (1997) (holding that right to assisted suicide is not
fundamental liberty interest protected by Due Process Clause).
120. See id. at 723.
121. See id. at 725-28.
122. Id. at 728.
123. Id.
124. See Steven B. Datlof, Beyond Washington v. Glucksberg: Oregon's Death with
Dignity Act Analyzed from Medical and Constitutional Perspectives, 14J.L. & HEALTH 23
(1999-2000) (analyzing "death with dignity" statutes in light of Glucksberg decision).
125. See Glen R. Anstine, Comment, A House Divided: Substantive Due Process in
the Twentieth Century, 62 NEB. L. REv. 316, 327-34 (1983) (looking at how substan-
tive due process has been interpreted throughout Supreme Court's history).
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can glean some broad philosophical concepts that are at work in the case
law of substantive due process. It is important to note that, at times in the
cases, the Court did not merely state a philosophical principle or belief in
different terms, but rather posited two diametrically opposed ideas.
126
In making its substantive due process decisions, the Court has consist-
ently put forth an anthropological view marked by "radical individual-
ism." 127 In his Bowers dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had been used to defend
personal rights surrounding the family for the benefit of the individual,
not society. 128 In other words, for the Court, "[t]he family's value is mea-
sured by its contributions to individual gratification."1 29 In Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,13 0 Justice Stevens went so
far as to say that "the concept of privacy embodies the 'moral fact that a
person belongs to himself and not others nor to society as a whole." 131 In
Casey, the Court noted that "[o]ur precedents 'have respected the private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter."1 3 2 It went on to assert
that "[t]hese matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
126. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498-99 (1965) (Goldberg,
J., concurring) ("Finally, it should be said of the Court's holding today that it in no
way interferes with a State's proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or miscon-
duct. . . . 'Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the
State forbids .... "), and Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 552 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) ("I would not suggest that adultery, homosexuality, fornication and
incest are immune from criminal enquiry, however privately practiced."), with Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (denying states' right to ban homosexual
sodomy).
127. See BORK, SLOUCHING, supra note 76, at 96-119. Elsewhere, Bork con-
tends that, by and large, Supreme Court justices are members of the "New Class,"
which is characterized by "a passion for . . . radical autonomy for the individual
(but only in a hierarchical and bourgeois culture-when that is replaced, there
will be little tolerance for individualism . . . ." BORK, COERCING VIRTUE, supra note
16, at 6. The Supreme Court is not the only place where such individualism has
been noted. See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, American Legal Culture: The Last
Thirty-Five Years, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 529 (1991); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal
Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REv. 963 (1987) (exploring role of radical
individualism in modern legal ethics).
128. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204 (1986) (Blackmun,J., dissent-
ing) (noting that familial rights are protected under Fourteenth Amendment "not
because they contribute . . . to general public welfare, but because they form so
central a part of an individual's life"), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
129. BORK, SLOUCHING, supra note 76, at 104.
130. 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
131. Id. at 777 n.5 (Stevens,J., concurring) (quoting Charles Fried, Correspon-
dence, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 288-89 (1977)). In Bowers, however, Justice Blackmun
did admit that the "Court [has] recognized . . . that the 'ability independently to
define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty' cannot truly be exer-
cised in a vacuum; we all depend on the 'emotional enrichment from close ties
with others.'" 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
132. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944)) (discussing constitutional protection of individual's choice in matters "re-
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person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."1 33 In Lawrence, this concept of autonomy played a key role in the
Court's discovery of a right to homosexual sodomy and repudiation of the
Bowers ruling. 1
3 4
Furthermore, the substantive due process cases indicate that personal
freedom is the highest good for the Court. For the Lawrence majority, one
of the Constitution's primary roles was to advance citizen freedoms: "As
the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its prin-
ciples in their own search for greater freedom."' 35 Similarly, in Griswold,
the Court identified the frequently applied principle that a "'governmen-
tal purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.' "136
In his Bowers dissent, Justice Blackmun approved Justice Brandeis's
famous assertion that "'the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men [is] the right to be let alone." 1 37 Indeed,
Russell Hittinger observes that Brandeis's assertion, though dictum, has
become a permanent feature of our judge-made law, and is cited as "a
kind of self-evident norm regulating the relationship between government
and the citizens." 3 " Taken at face value, this language seems incredible
because certain other rights-such as the right to life or the right to be
free from human enslavement-appear to be substantially more impor-
tant to true human flourishing than the putative right identified by Justice
Brandeis.'3 9 As Hittinger notes:
lating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, childrearing,
and education").
133. Id. (emphasis added) (announcing constitutional right to "define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life"). Bork criticizes Casey for, among other reasons, "invent[ing] a here-
tofore unheard-of constitutional right to 'personal dignity and autonomy."' BORK,
SLOUCHING, supra note 76, at 103.
134. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (relying on individual
autonomy recognized in Casey to extend same autonomy to "[p] ersons in a homo-
sexual relationship").
135. Id. at 578-79.
136. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (quoting NAACP v.
Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)).
137. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun,J., dissenting)
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,J., dissent-
ing)), overruled by, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
138. RUSSELL HrIrlNGER, THE FIRST GRACE: REDISCOVERING THE NATURAL LAW
IN A POST-CHRISTIAN WORLD 135 (2003).
139. See, e.g., JUDE P. DOUGHERTY, WESTERN CREED, WESTERN IDENTITY: ESSAYS
IN LEGAL. AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 164-66 (2000) (providing example of "funda-
mental" human rights as child's right to life versus "social" right to livelihood, and
contending that fundamental rights must "be closely identified with indispensible
human needs, apart from social considerations");JA:QUES MARITAIN, NAN AND THE
STATE 76-107 (1958);JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER: Evangelium Vitae (1995), in
263
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The proposition that a comprehensive "right to be left alone" is
the right "most valued by civilized men" is an odd one, since the
word "civilized" derives from civis, or citizen. If we were to make
a short list of those rights most prized by citizens, we might start
with the political franchise itself; from there, one might go on to
mention the right to hold office, to engage in mutual delibera-
tion with one's fellow citizens in legislative assemblies; one might
at least call attention to the First Amendment right of being able
to petition the government for redress of grievances. These
rights are specifically "political" because each one guarantees ac-
cess to and participation in the political process. We might also
mention those goods and privileges which accrue to anyone who
enjoys political order: for example, protection against arbitrary
violence; the ability to settle disputes in public courts according
to known and standing laws; and the orderly and just distribution
of common resources, such as education and healthcare. 140
Nevertheless, if one accepts the word of the Court, Justice Brandeis's asser-
tion is what it truly believes.
The fact that the Court values personal human freedom above every-
thing else is perhaps best illustrated by its treatment of abortion.14 1 In
Roe, the Court explicitly claimed not to make the determination of when
human life begins. 142 It did hold, however, that a woman has a fundamen-
tal right to seek an abortion, and that any state regulation of abortion
must pass strict judicial scrutiny. 143 This paradox led Robert P. George to
POPE JOHN PAUL II, THE GOSPEL OF LIFE 9-11 (1995) (describing "right to life" as
"fundamental"). For a distinction between authentic and spurious rights, see JOHN
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 198-230 (1980); WILLIAM E. MAY, CATH-
OLIC BIOETHICS AND THE Gvr OF HUMAN LIFE 174-75 (2000) (discussing difference
between "fight" and "liberty"). See generally HADLEY ARKs, NATURAL RIGHTS AND
THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE (2004). Followers ofJustice Brandeis might be surprised to
learn that in Russia there is evidence that, even after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the population values "order" much more than "freedom." See Richard
Pipes, Right From Freedom: What Russians Think and Want, FOREIGN AFF., May/June
2004, at 9, 9-12 (illustrating that Russian population, even after tsarist, communist,
and socialist rule, does not render much support for "enhancing personal free-
doms and improving civil rights").
140. See HITrINGER, supra note 138, at 135-36.
141. See Amy Lotierzo, Comment, The Unborn Child, A Forgotten Interest: Reexam-
ining Roe in Light of Increased Recognition of Fetal Rights, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 279, 299-
302 (2006) (contending pre-born humans are class completely ignored in Cotrt's
abortion decisions).
142. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) ("We need not resolve the
difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disci-
plines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus,
the judiciary... is not in a position to speculate as to the answer."). For a view that
such sidestepping must be avoided, see SANDEL, supra note 50, at 100-03.
143. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164 (asserting that abortion statute "that excepts from
criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to
pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
[Vol. 54: p. 247
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conclude that Justice Blackmun, who authored the majority opinion in
Roe, "implicitly ... resolve[d] precisely this question quite against the pro-
position that 'life begins' anytime prior to birth." ' 4 4 More importantly, by
failing at the outset to resolve the threshold question of when life begins,
the Roe Court strayed from its self-constructed judicial duty to resolve fac-
tual and structural disputes of federal constitutional issues. 145 It is illustra-
tive of the Court's ideology that it erred on the side of the woman's
purported "liberty... to abort," rather than the pre-born human being's
right to life or "claim right that his or her mother (and others) forbear
from aborting it."146 The Court's treatment of abortion contrasts sharply
with that found in a number of European countries that have been much
more willing to recognize pre-born rights.1 47 While the plurality's reason-
ing in Casey was not identical to Justice Blackmun's in Roe, it nonetheless
determined that "the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained
and once again reaffirmed.' 48
It is also clear that, under the Court's substantive due process view,
the majority has definite limitations in the political community, especially
as concerns the promotion of morality. 149 Critical of the path that the
Court has taken, Robert Bork comments that:
The Court in modern times has regularly maximized individual
rights against the corporate rights of all intermediate institutions.
In the adversarial relationship between the individual and society
posited by Mill's 'one very simple principle,' the Court in matters
of morality and social discipline has sided with Mill far more
often than the Constitution warrants. 150
144. GEORGE, THE CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES, supra note 7, at 143-44.
145. See Robert M. Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41
FORDHAM L. REv. 807, 813 (1973) (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 272
(1959)).
146. MAY, supra note 139, at 175.
147. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW
13-39 (1987) (comparing abortion laws in twenty countries, including United
States); PatrickJ. Flood, Abortion and the Right to Life in Post-Communist Eastern
Europe and Russia, 36 E. EUR. Q. 191, 195-218 (2002); Donald P. Kommers, Abor-
tion and Constitution: United States and West Germany, 25 AM.J. Comp. L. 255, 258-64,
267-75 (1977); Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Law of Abortion in Germany:
Should Americans Pay Attention?, 10J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'V 1, 4-26 (1994);
West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 JOHN MARSHALLJ. PRAC.
& PROC. 605, 605-22 (Robert E. Jonas & John D. Gorby trans., 1976); UNITED NA-
TIONS DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, POPULATION Div., WORLD ABORTION POLICIES
2007 (2007), http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/2007Abortion_
Policies_Chart/2007_.WallChart.pdf.
148. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
149. See Sonu Bedi, Repudiating Morals Legislation: Rendering the Constitutional
Right to Privaty Obsolete, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 447, 452-54 (2005-2006); Christian J.
Grostic, Note, Evolving Objective Standards: A Developmental Approach to Constitutional
Review of Morals Legislation, 105 MICH. L. REv. 151 (2006).
150. BORK, SLOUCHING, supra note 76, at 96-97.
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For example, in his concurrence in Skinner v. Oklahoma,15 1 a predecessor
of the modern substantive due process cases, Justice Jackson asserted that
"[t] here are limits to the extent to which a legislatively represented major-
ity may conduct biological experiments at the expense of the dignity and
personality and natural powers of a minority-even those who have been
guilty of what the majority define as crimes." 1 52 What's more, in the wake
of Lawrence, it is quite possible to doubt that morals legislation will ever
again pass constitutional muster.' 53 In expressly overruling Bowers, Justice
Kennedy quoted Justice Stevens's dissent in Bowers: "'Our prior cases make
•.. abundantly clear [that] ... the fact that the governing majority in a
State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a suffi-
cient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice...."154
Finally, it is important to stress that the Court's substantive due pro-
cess rulings exhibit a philosophy of moral relativism, the belief that
"den[ies] the capacity of reason to know objective moral truth."1 55 The
paradigm of the Court's embracement of this ideology is the famous "mys-
tery passage" in Casey: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life." 15 6 Critics of Casey's "mystery passage" have identified its
relativism and the problems that accompany such a philosophical tenet. '
57
James Schall retorts that "[t]he justifying principle stated in ... [Casey]
makes it quite impossible, as an intellectual principle, to distinguish be-
tween a Hitler and a Mother Teresa, between a monster and a wise
man."158 Robert Bork adds that "[t]he words [of the 'mystery passage']
151. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
152. Id. at 546 (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting that statute failed constitu-
tional test before reaching issue of limits of government intrusion on natural
rights).
153. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003);Joseph Bozzuti, Note,
The Constitutionality of Polygamy Prohibitions After Lawrence v. Texas: Is Scalia a
Punchline or a Prophet?, 43 CATH. LAw. 409, 441 (2004) (concluding that after Law-
rence, morals legislation is vulnerable to constitutional attack).
154. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (concluding that holding in Bowers fails to with-
stand constitutional analysis).
155. See RICE, THE WINNING SIDE, supra note 73, at 91; see also JOHN FINNIs,
FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS 56-79 (1983) (exploring objectivity of moral proposi-
tions and moral agents, and arguing that "[r]easonableness ... requires us to
reject radical skepticism as both unjustified and literally self-refuting").
156. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (dis-
ctLssing constitutional protection of right to make decisions regarding "marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education");
see also BORK, COERCING VIRTUE, supra note 16, at 71-72 (designating quoted section
from Casey as "mystery passage").
157. See, e.g., Robert John Araujo, S.J., Conscience, Totalitarianism, and the Posi-
tivist Mind, 77 Miss. L.J. 571, 583-84 (2007); Robert P. Casey, Governor of the Com-
monwealth of Pa., The Pope John XXIII Lecture (Sept. 30, 1994), in 44 CATH. U.
L. REv. 821, 824 (1995).
158. SCHALL, supra note 81, at 49.
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are devoid of any ascertainable meaning. They could as easily be used to
protect the unborn child's right to define his or her concept of exis-
tence." 15 9 Furthermore, some suggest that the undue burden standard-
the basic framework that Casey set forth to judge abortion regulations-
reflects the Court's general sympathy towards moral relativism. 160
IV. THE THEORY OF THE NATURAL LAW
The natural law has enjoyed a long history in Western thought. 16 1 In
different forms, it has been defended by Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, St. Paul,
St. Augustine, John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Martin
Luther King, Jr.' 62 Though various accounts have been offered as to the
essence and requirements of the natural law, the most influential has ar-
guably been that of St. Thomas Aquinas.' 63 This Article largely follows
159. BoRK, COERCING VIRTUE, supra note 16, at 71-72.
160. See, e.g., Curtis E. Harris, An Undue Burden: Balancing in an Age of Relativ-
ism, 18 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 363 (1993). In Casey, the Court characterized the
undue burden standard as a woman's right to be free "from unduly burdensome
interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy."
505 U.S. at 874.
161. See generally HEINRICH ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAw: A STUDY IN LEGAL
AND SOCIAL HISTORY AND PILOSOPHY (Thomas R. Hanley trans., B. Herder Book
Co. 1959) (1936); YVES R. SIMON, THE TRADITION OF NATURAL LAw: A PHILOSO-
PHER'S REFLECTIONS (1992).
162. See GEORGE, THE CLASHt OF ORTHODOXIES, supra note 7, at 160-68. See
generally J. BUDZISZEWSI, WRITTEN ON THE HEART: THE CASE FOR NATURAL LAW
(1997); RUFUS BURROW, JR., GOD AND HUMAN DIGNITY: THE PERSONALISM, THEOL-
OGY, AND ETHICS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING,JR. (2006); KNUD HAAKONSSEN, NATURAL
LAw AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY: FROM GROTIUS TO THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT
(1996); GARYJ. JACOBSOLIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DECLINE OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL ASPIRATION (1986); Fred D. Miller, Aristotle on Natural Law and Justice, in A
COMPANION TO ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS 279 (David Keyt & Fred D. Miller eds., 1991);
Anton-Hermann Chroust, The Philosophy of Law of St. Augustine, 53 PHIL. REV. 195
(1944);Joseph P. Maguire, Plato's Theory of Natural Law, 10 YALE CLASSICAL STUD.
151 (1947); William G. Merkel,Jefferson, Natural Law, and the Problem of Slavery
During the Revolutionary Period (2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001 &context=William_
merkel; S. Adam Seagrave, Cicero, Aquinas, and Contemporary Issues in Natural Law
Theory, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science
Association (Apr. 3, 2008), available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/
p 2 6 7 120_index.html.
163. See FULVIO DI BLASI, GOD AND THE NATURAL LAw: A REREADING OF
THOMAS AQUINAS 228 (David Thunder trans., 2006) (2003); RICE, FIFTY QUESTIONS,
supra note 76, at 49; Ralph Mclnerny, The Principles of Natural Law, 25 Am. J. JURiS-
PRUDENCE 1, 2 (1980). John Paul II asserted that "Saint Thomas is an authentic
model for all who seek the truth." JOHN PAUL I, ENCYCLICAL LETTER: Fides et Ratio
(1998), in POPEJOHN PAUL II, ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAITH AND REASON
114 (1998). The Pope continued, "[iln his thinking, the demands of reason and
the power of faith found the most elevated synthesis ever attained by human
thought, for he could defend the radical newness introduced by Revelation with-
out ever demeaning the venture proper to reason." Id. at 114-15. For a helpful
review of scholarly literature in the natural law field, see James V. Schall, S.J., The
Natural Law Bibliography, 40 AM. J. JURISPRUDENCE 157 (1995). For an overview of
the work of Aquinas, see RALPH MCINERNY, ST. THOMAS AQUINAS (1982); ETIENNE
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Aquinas's view, both in his own words and in the writings of his modern
interpreters. 164
Aquinas taught that reality contained four different types of law: eter-
nal, natural, human, and divine. 165 According to Aquinas, law "is nothing
else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who
has the care of the community."' 6 6 He defined eternal law as "the Divine
Reason's conception of things. 1 67 Alternatively, St. Augustine called the
eternal law "the reason or the will of God, who commands us to respect
the natural order and forbids us to disturb it.'
6 8
Aquinas saw human law as grounded in the natural law: "[I] t is from
the precepts of the natural law, as from general . . .principles, that the
human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determination of
certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human rea-
son, are called human laws, provided the other essential conditions of law
be observed .... -169 In Aquinas's understanding, a human law is legiti-
mate only to the extent that its authors derive it from the natural law. 1 70
Like Augustine, Aquinas contended that an unjust law is, in reality, not a
law. 1 7 1 For Aquinas, the divine law is synonymous with divine revelation
(i.e., the Catholic Bible). 172 Aquinas believed that the divine law serves an
GILSON, THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS (L.K. Shook trans.,
1956).
164. See generally ST. THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE NATURAL LAw TRADITION: CON-
TEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES (John Goyette, Mark S. Latkovic & Richard S. Myers eds.,
2004). Followers of Aquinas sometimes disagree dramatically on aspects of his the-
ory. See, e.g., JANET E. SMITH, HumANAE VIrE: A GENERATION LATER 348-52 & n.28
(1991). This Article does not focus on this debate, but instead concentrates on the
substantive answers to moral questions, where modem Thomists usually agree. See,
e.g., Germain Grisez, A New Formulation of a Natural-Law Argument Against Contracep-
tion, THOMIST, 1966, at 343; Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, John Finnis & William
E. May, "Every Marital Act Ought to Be Open to New Life": Toward a Clearer Understand-
ing, THOMIST, 1988, at 365 (arguing for moral correctness of conclusion of papal
encyclical, but offering alternative justification for such conclusion).
165. SeeF.C. COPLESTON, AQUINAS 21942 (1991); RCE, FIFTY QUESTIONS, supra
note 76, at 50.
166. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, 8 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" OF ST. THOMAS AQUI-
NAS, PRIMA SECUNDAE PARTIs 8, q. 90, a. 4 (Fathers of the English Dominican Prov-
ince trans., 1927) [hereinafter S.T. I-I] (discussing "whether promulgation is
essential to a law").
167. Id. at 9-10, q. 91, a. 1 (answering "whether there is an eternal law").
168. RICE, FiFTY QUESTIONS, supra note 76, at 50 (quoting Augustine).
169. S.T. I-Il, supra note 166, at 12-14, q. 91, a. 3 (ascertaining "whether there
is a human law").
170. See FREDERICK COPLESTON, 2 A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY." MEDIEVAL PHILOS-
oPHY 418-19 (1962) (explaining that human law is derivative of natural law, and
that function of legislature is to define and apply human law that is compatible
with natural law).
171. See S.T. I-I, supra note 166, at 69-71, q. 96, a. 4 (discussing whether
"human law binds a man in conscience").
172. See RICE, FiFTY QUESTIONS, supra note 76, at 54.
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essential role in human flourishing, one complementary to those played
by the natural and human laws. 173
As to the natural law, Aquinas stated:
[S]ince all things subject to Divine providence are ruled and
measured by the eternal law.., it is evident that all things par-
take somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its
being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclina-
tions to their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the
rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most ex-
cellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by
being provident both for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a
share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination
to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law
in the rational creature is called the natural law .... [T] he light
of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is
evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than
an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that
the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's partici-
pation of the eternal law.1 74
In articulating this conception of natural law, Aquinas essentially asserted
that "by using our reason and reflecting on our nature as people, we can
come to formulate general principles of action."' 75 He rejected the argu-
ment that there is only one natural law precept. 176 Yet Aquinas did spell
out what constituted the first precept of the natural law, which, according
to him, is self-evident: " [G]ood is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be
avoided." 177 Every other natural law precept flows from this principle, "so
that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or
evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or
avoided." 17 8
Practically, for Aquinas, the moral correctness of an action depends
on the nature or essence of human beings. 179 Aquinas believed that basic
human inclinations reflect human nature. Furthermore, "all those things
173. See S.T. I-II, supra note 166, at 14-15, q. 91, a. 4 (assessing "whether there
was any need for a Divine law").
174. Id. at 10-12, q. 91, a. 2 (answering "whether there is in us a natural law").
175. BRIAN DAVIES, THE THOUGHIT OF THOMAS AQUINAS 245 (1992).
176. See S.T. I-I, supra note 166, at 42-44, q. 94, a. 2 (discussing "whether the
natural law contains several precepts, or only one").
177. Id. Aquinas further explained: "[T]he precepts of the natural law are to
practical reason, what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative
reason; because both are self-evident principles." Id.
178. Id.
179. See RiCE, FIFTY QUESTIONS, supra note 76, at 52. For a contemporary look
at Aristotle and Aquinas on human nature, see Thomas S. Hibbs, Introduction to
Human Nature, International Catholic University, http://home.comcast.net/
-icuweb/c01500.htm (last visited May 13, 2009).
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to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by rea-
son as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their con-
traries as evil, and objects of avoidance."180 In Aquinas's understanding,
"human beings are fulfilled or made happy in ways which can be seen by
noting what they are (including how they act and what they are drawn to)
and that practical reason can therefore be used to indicate how, in gen-
eral, they should behave."' 81
In the Thomistic system, the order of the natural inclinations forms
the order of the natural law precepts. 182 Aquinas derived the following list
of fundamental goods from his observations of basic human inclinations:
1) human life and its preservation, 2) procreation and rearing of children,
3) gaining knowledge of truth, specifically about God, and 4) living with
other humans in society. 18 3 In striving to attain these goods, however,
humans must act reasonably, responsibly, and deliberately.184 As Ralph
McInerny states:
Natural Law is a dictate of reason. Precepts of natural law are
rational directives aiming at the good for man. The human
goods, man's ultimate end, is complex, but the unifying thread is
the distinctive mark of the human, i.e., reason; so too law is a
work of reason. Man does not simply have an instinct for self-
preservation. He recognizes self-preservation as a good and de-
vises ways and means to secure it in shifting circumstances. Man
does not merely have a sexual instinct. Recognizing the desirabil-
ity of sexual companionship, reproduction, offspring, he con-
sciously directs himself to those goods as goods without which he
would not be complete. 185
In Aquinas's understanding, God placed such inclinations into people's
human nature to assist them in attaining their greatest good: eternal
happiness.' 8
6
Modern commentators interpret Aquinas's work on the natural law in
different ways.' 87 According to Janet E. Smith, "[a] very simple summary"
of Aquinas on the natural law would be the following three foundational
truths:
1. Man, by the power of his reason, is capable of discerning some
moral truths. "Natural law" refers both to Man's inherent desire
to seek the good and avoid what is evil and to his ability to dis-
180. S.T. I-1I, supra note 166, at 4244, q. 94, a. 2.
181. DAVIES, supra note 175, at 246.
182. See S.T. I-II, supra note 166, at 42-44, q. 94, a. 2.
183. See id.
184. See Mclnerny, supra note 163, at 4.
185. Id. at 5.
186. See RACE, FiFry QUESTIONS, supra note 76, at 52.
187. See, e.g., id. at 51 ("The natural law is therefore a rule of reason, promul-
gated by God in man's nature, whereby man can discern how he should act.").
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cern what is good and thus to be sought, what is evil, and thus to
be avoided .... 2. The workings of nature, the "laws" of nature,
are not the same as the natural law-for natural law includes
Man's ability to reason as well as his natural inclinations. But the
laws of nature are, nonetheless, important guides in Man's pro-
cess of discernment. Included in the category of "nature" is the
nature of Man in all his physical, psychological, and spiritual
dimensions. The better Man knows his natural inclinations, the
better he can act, and ultimately such action should promote
human well-being and happiness .... 3. Nature is an important
guide to truth because God is the author of nature, and, thus, in
some sense respect for nature manifests a respect for God. More-
over, nature is designed in accord with reason, for God governs
the universe. Thus, to act in accord with nature is to act in ac-
cord with reason and to act in accord with reason is to act in
accord with nature. Most understandings of natural law, how-
ever, do not require that the recognition that God is the author
of the natural law be a conscious element in reasoning well about
moral matters.18 8
Robert George, who follows the thought of John Finnis and Germain
Grisez, describes the natural law as "consist[ing] of three sets of
principles":
[F]irst, and most fundamentally, a set of principles directing
human choice and action toward intelligible purposes, i.e., basic
human goods which, as intrinsic aspects of human well-being and
fulfillment, constitute reasons for action whose intelligibility as
reasons does not depend on any more fundamental reasons (or
on sub-rational motives such as the desire for emotional satisfac-
tions) to which they are mere means; second, a set of "intermedi-
ate" moral principles which specify the most basic principles of
morality by directing choice and action toward possibilities that
may be chosen consistently with a will toward integral human ful-
fillment and away from possibilities the choosing of which is in-
consistent with such a will; and third, fully specific moral norms
which require or forbid (sometimes without exceptions) certain
specific possible choices.1 89
188. SMITH, supra note 164, at 71. See generally RALPH MCINERNY, ETHICA
THOMISTICA: THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS AQUINAS (1982).
189. ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAw 102 (1999) (citations
omitted). For a useful statement of the Finnis-Grisez view, see Germain Grisez,
Joseph M. Boyle & John Finnis, Practical Principles, Moral Truths and Ultimate Ends,
32 AM. J. JURISPRUDENCE 99 (1987).
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V. NATURAL LAW CRITICISMS OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
From this basic review, it is clear that the philosophical tenets of natu-
ral law theory differ sharply from those of substantive due process. Recall
that in its substantive due process rulings, the Supreme Court has consist-
ently stressed the autonomous nature of human beings and has promoted
what critics refer to as "radical individualism."1 90 Conversely, Aquinas
identified living well in a community as one of the basic human goods,
which reflected his belief that humans are by nature social. 19 1
The substantive due process corpus indicates that personal freedom is
the most important good for the Court. 192 In contrast, Aquinas asserted
that man's "highest good... is eternal happiness with God."19 3 Freedom
is not even listed among his fundamental goods, though he certainly ac-
knowledged that humans possessed it. 1 94 Instead, Aquinas viewed free-
dom as a means, not an end in itself.195 Additionally, George contends
that "[w] e need not embrace the idea of a moral right to do moral wrong
in any strong sense to ensure that people will have available to them valua-
ble opportunities to test their moral mettle and (further) develop their
moral character."19 6
Finally, in its substantive due process decisions, the Court has largely
espoused an ideology of moral relativism. 19 7 Traditional natural law phi-
losophy has always affirmed the existence of absolute moral principles.198
Indeed, Aquinas stated: "It is therefore evident that, as regards the general
principles whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude
190. For a summary of the Supreme Court's emphasis on the autonomous
nature of human beings, see supra notes 12748 and accompanying text.
191. See S.T. I-II, supra note 166, at 44, q. 94, a. 2; see alsoJohn Finnis, Aquinas'
Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(2005), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas-moral-political/.
192. For a discussion of personal freedom in the context of substantive due
process, see supra notes 13548 and accompanying text.
193. RICE, Ftvrv QUESTIONS, supra note 76, at 52. See generally SAINT THOMAS
AQUINAS, TREATISE ON HAPPINESS (John A. Oesterle trans., 1991).
194. See JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 170
(1998) [hereinafter FINNIS, AQUINAS].
195. See George Weigel, A Better Concept of Freedom, FIRST THINGS, Mar. 2002, at
14, available at http://www.firstthings.com/article.php3?idarticle=1992.
196. ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC Mo-
RALIIy 128 (1993) [hereinafter GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL].
197. For an overview of moral relativism in the context of the Supreme
Court's substantive due process decisions, see supra notes 155-60 and accompany-
ing text.
198. SeeJoHN FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES: TRADITION, REVISION, AND TRUTH 2
(1991) [hereinafter FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES]. Finnis makes the point that "[a]
good label for the disputed absolutes would be exceptionless moral norms." Id. at 3;
see also WILLIAM E. MAY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL THEOLOGY 127-32, 13943
(1994); Ralph McInerny, Thomas Aquinas and Moral Relativism, in THE EVER-ILLUMI-
NATING WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS AQUINA 85, 85-98 (1999).
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is the same for all, and is equally known by all." 199 Furthermore, accord-
ing to Rice, the "fact that people are in error in their perception of the
natural law may reduce or eliminate their subjective culpability. But
whether or not such people are culpable, some acts are always objectively
wrong."2
0 0
Applying traditional natural law analysis, one often comes to different
moral conclusions than the Court reached in its substantive due process
cases. In other words, the particular practice that the Court has declared
constitutionally protected is found illicit under a natural law inquiry, al-
though admittedly, constitutional is not synonymous with moral. Never-
theless, the words will be used interchangeably in the sense just described,
not in the sense that a justice's vote in a particular case equals his or her
personal opinion on the legitimacy of the action in question.20 1 This Arti-
cle will now examine the major substantive due process cases and their
moral conclusions from a traditional natural law perspective.
A. Contraception
In Griswold, the Court ruled that a state could not proscribe the use of
contraceptives by married people.20 2 In Eisenstadt, the Court clarified that
"whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be,
the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike."2 0
3
In contrast, contraception has long been viewed as violative of the natural
law. 20 4 "Thomas Aquinas spoke of contraception as wrong.., because it
was an act against nature; his became the more common justification for
the condemnation of contraception. His view rested on the premise that
God was the author of nature and that respecting the order of nature was
respecting God's will." 20 5 Furthermore, in 1968, when Pope Paul VI reaf-
firmed the Catholic Church's longstanding prohibition on contraception,
he explicitly appealed to the natural law as a basis for his decision.20 6
199. S.T. I-1l, supra note 166, at 47-48, q. 94, a. 4. See generally Patrick Lee,
Permanence of the Ten Commandments: St. Thomas and His Modern Commentators, 42
THEOLOGICAL STUD. 422 (1981).
200. RICE, FIvT QUESTIONS, supra note 76, at 53.
201. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)
("Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of
morality, but that cannot control our decision.").
202. For the holding and rationale of Griswold, see supra notes 38-47 and ac-
companying text.
203. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). For further discussion of
Eisenstadt, see supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
204. See FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES, supra note 198, at 85-86.
205. SMITH, supra note 164, at 4-5.
206. See PAUL VI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER: Humane Vitae (1968), in THE GOSPEL OF
PEACE AND JUSTICE: CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING SINCE POPEJOHN 429 (1991). For a
skilled translation, see SMITH, supra note 164, at 272-95.
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There are several main natural law arguments against the use of con-
traception. 20 7 According to Janet Smith, three such arguments are:
[1.] It is wrong to impede the procreative power of actions that
are ordained by their nature to the generation of new human
life.... Contraception impedes the procreative power of actions
that are ordained by their nature to the generation of new
human life. . . . Therefore, contraception is wrong. [2.] It is
wrong to impede the procreative power of actions that are or-
dained by their nature to assist God in performing His creative
act that brings forth a new human life .... Contraception im-
pedes the procreative power of actions that are ordained by their
nature to assist God in performing His creative act that brings
forth a new human life .... Therefore, contraception is wrong.
[3.] It is wrong to destroy the power of human sexual intercourse
to represent objectively the mutual, total self-giving of
spouses.... Contraception destroys the power of human sexual
intercourse to represent objectively the mutual, total self-giving
of spouses .... Therefore, contraception is wrong.
20 8
Finnis, Grisez, and their collaborators additionally contend "that while
contraception is wrong for several reasons, it is wrong primarily and essen-
tially because it is contralife." 20 9
Plainly, according to the traditional understanding of the natural law,
the use of contraceptives is morally unacceptable. Because the Court
found such use constitutionally protected in Griswold and Eisenstadt, it
would seem that the moral conclusion of substantive due process is in di-
rect opposition to that of natural law. 210 Despite his strict condemnation
of contraception as a moral matter, however, Germain Grisez approves of
the Griswold decision: "I think that the Connecticut statute was, in fact,
unjust.... [This] view.., is based not on a morally favorable judgment of
contraception, but on the view that the use of contraceptives does not vio-
late any person's rights nor in any clear and proximate way injure com-
mon purposes of civil society."2 1'
Grisez's statement illustrates a tenet that natural law thinkers have tra-
ditionally held: the government should not criminalize every immoral
practice.2 12 Aquinas argued that the state should not proscribe all vicious
207. See SMITH, supra note 164, at 98-128.
208. Id. at 99.
209. JOHN C. FORD, GERMAIN GRISEZ,JOSEPH BOYLE, JOHN FINNIS & WILLIAM E.
MAY, THE TEACHING OF HumANAE ViTAE: A DEFENSE 39 (1988). For an earlier ver-
sion of this line of reasoning, see GERMAIN GRISEZ, CONTRACEPTION AND THE NATU-
RAL LAW (1964).
210. See RICE, FIFv QUESTIONS, supra note 76, at 114 (condemning Griswold
decision as reflecting "latitudinarian approach" to constitutional interpretation).
211. GERMAIN GRISEZ, ABORTION: THE MYTHS, THE REALITIES, AND THE ARGU-
MENTS 438 (1970).
212. See GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL, supra note 196, at 19-47.
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activity, but only the most nefarious actions-"chiefly those that are to the
hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human society could not
be maintained . .. murder, theft and suchlike.12 13 In modern times, on
the matter of public morality, John Finnis contends that the power of the
government is limited by its essential purpose, namely to facilitate individ-
ual and communal well-being.214
B. Abortion
While its ruling in Casty may have given states somewhat greater lati-
tude in regulating abortion, the Court's pronouncements on the subject
have played a substantial role in bringing widespread abortion to
America. 215 In Casey, the Court stressed that a woman's right to procure
an abortion is a fundamental constitutional right.2 16 As in the case of con-
traception, this conclusion runs afoul of traditional natural law analysis,
insofar as the Court provided a constitutional guarantee to something that
is illicit under the natural law.2 17
The natural law argument against abortion is relatively straightfor-
ward. The natural law proscribes the direct, intentional killing of inno-
cent human persons. 2 18 Aquinas declared that "[t]herefore it is in no way
lawful to slay the innocent."2 19 Grisez explains that:
Historically, many natural law theories have proceeded on a con-
viction that respect for human life is a primary moral principle.
Each man by nature desires to preserve his own life, and no one
can reasonably expect others to respect his life except on the ba-
sis of a universal principle that human life as such has a dignity in
virtue of which it should be respected and protected. We can
easily imagine a society in which only the lives of those strong
enough to cause trouble would be respected, but such a society,
213. S.T. I-I, supra note 166, at 66, q. 96, a. 2.
214. SeeJohn Finnis, Is Natural Law Theory Compatible with Limited Government?,
in NATURAL LAw, LIBERALISM, AND MORALITv 1, 1-26 (Robert P. George ed., 2001).
215. See e.g., DELLAPENNA, supra note 62, at 732, 887-92; MARVIN OLASKY, ABOR-
TION RITES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ABORTION IN AMERICA (1992); Gerard V. Bradley,
Life's Dominion: A Review Essay, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 372-74 (1993);
Clarke D. Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser, The Tragic Failure of Roe v. Wade: Why
Abortion Should be Returned to the States, 10 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 85, 109 (2005); R.K.
Jones et al., Abortion in the United States: Incidence and Access to Services, 2005, 40
PERSP. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 6 (2008); see also Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 782-83 (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
216. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844-71 (1992).
217. See FINNIs, AQUINAS, supra note 194, at 140 n.35, 186; John T. Noonan,
Jr., Aquinas on Abortion, in ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETHICS 245, 245-
48 (Paul E. Sigmund ed., 1988); John Haldane & Patrick Lee, Aquinas on Human
Ensoulment, Abortion and the Value of Life, 78 PHIL. 255, 261-62 (2003).
218. SeeJoHN FINNIS, JOSEPH BOYLE & GERMAIN GRISEZ, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE,
MORALITY AND REALISM 297-319 (1987).
219. S.T. 1-Il, supra note 166, at 207, q. 64, a. 6.
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based on exploitation of the weak, would necessarily fall short of
the justice necessary for genuine community.220
Consequently, abortion is never morally acceptable if the being de-
stroyed by the act is in fact an innocent human person. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to answer fully that extremely important moral ques-
tion. 221 It is enough to point out that an overwhelming majority of cur-
rent natural law thinkers agree that abortion is the killing of an innocent
human person and is therefore illicit.2 22 For example, Charles Rice goes
so far as to say: "Roe v. Wade, by sanctioning the violent execution of inno-
cent unborn children, by their own mothers at the scalpel-wielding hands
of professionals ostensibly dedicated to preserving human life, has contrib-
uted in a unique way to the cycle of violence and the unraveling of our
social order."223 Russell Hittinger charges critically that Casey bestowed
upon citizens "a moral or constitutional right to kill the unborn." 224 Hit-
tinger also includes Casey in what he calls "a long train of court rulings that
constitutionalize principles contrary to rightly formed conscience." 225
Thus, evidence overwhelmingly indicates that the natural law tradition
stands firmly opposed to the abortion license granted by the Court in Roe
and Casey.
C. Homosexual Conduct
In Lawrence, the Court overturned its previous ruling in Bowers and
held that states could not constitutionally proscribe homosexual sod-
omy.226 In contrast, classic natural law teaching has condemned such ho-
mosexual activity as immoral. 22 7 For example, Aquinas asserted that
220. Germain G. Grisez, Toward a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of Killing, 15
AM. J. JURISPRUDENCE 64, 65 (1970).
221. For thoughtful philosophical examinations of abortion, see PATRICK LEE,
ABORTION AND UNBORN HUMAN LIFE (1996); STEPHEN SCuWARz, THE MORAL QUES-
TION OF ABORTION (1990).
222. See, e.g., GEORGE, THE CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES supra note 7, at 317-23;
MAY, supra note 139, at 151-97; John Finnis, The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A
Reply toJudith Thomson, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 117 (1973); Charles E. Rice, Some Rea-
sons for a Restoration of Natural Law Jurisprudence, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 539, 546
(1989) ("Roe v. Wade, of course, established the right to procure and to perform
the intentional, direct killing of innocents as a constitutional right.").
223. Charles E. Rice &John P. Tuskey, The Legality and Morality of Using Deadly
Force to Protect Unborn Children from Abortionists, 5 REGENT U. L. REV. 83, 87 (1995).
224. HITTINGER, supra note 138, at 183.
225. Id. at 195.
226. For a discussion of the Lawrence holding, see supra notes 98-109 and ac-
companying text.
227. See, e.g., Janet E. Smith, Thomas Aquinas on Homosexuality, in HOMOSEXU-
ALITY AND AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 129, 12940 (Christopher Wolfe ed., 1999); John
M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1049
(1994). It is worth noting that heterosexual sodomy is also illicit under traditional
natural law analysis, for largely the same reasons as contraception. See RONALD
LAWLER, JOSEPH BOYLE, JR. & WILLIAM E. MAY, CATHOLIC SEXUAL ETHICS: A SUM-
MARY, EXPLANATION, & DEFENSE 163-64 (2d ed. 1998).
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"certain special sins are said to be against nature; thus contrary to sexual
intercourse, which is natural to all animals, is unisexual lust, which has
received the special name of the unnatural crime."228 According to Rice,
"[h]omosexual acts are intrinsically wrong."2 29
Additionally, Harry V. Jaffa contends that "sodomy and lesbianism...
are unnatural acts and, being unnatural, the very negation of anything
that could be called a right according to nature."230 Finally, Robert
George states the main natural law argument against homosexual sodomy:
Although not all reproductive-type acts are marital, there can be
no marital act that is not reproductive in type. Masturbatory,
sodomitical, or other sexual acts that are not reproductive in type
cannot unite persons organically: that is, as a single reproductive
principle. Therefore, such acts cannot be intelligibly engaged in
for the sake of marital (i.e., one-flesh, bodily) unity as such. They
cannot be marital acts. Rather, persons who perform such acts
must be doing so for the sake of ends or goals that are extrinsic
to themselves as bodily persons: Sexual satisfaction, or (perhaps)
mutual sexual satisfaction, is sought as a means of releasing ten-
sion, or obtaining (and, sometimes, sharing) pleasure, either as
an end in itself, or as a means to some other end, such as expres-
sing affection, esteem, friendliness, etc. In any case, where one-
flesh union cannot (or cannot rightly) be sought as an end-in-
itself, sexual activity necessarily involves the instrumentalization of
the bodies of those participating in such activity to extrinsic
ends.23 1
Thus, the practice the Court sanctioned in Lawrence runs counter to
the great weight of natural law thinking on the subject. This is not to say,
however, that all natural law theorists supported the anti-sodomy statute in
question. As Justice Clarence Thomas, who has been linked to the natural
law tradition, wrote in his Lawrence dissent:
[T]he law before the Court today "is ... uncommonly silly." If I
were a member of the Texas Legislature, I would vote to repeal it.
Punishing someone for expressing his sexual preference through
noncommercial consensual conduct with another adult does not
appear to be a worthy way to expend valuable law enforcement
resources.
23 2
228. S.T. I-II, supra note 166, at 46, q. 94, a. 3 (emphasis added).
229. RICE, THE WINNING SIDE, supra note 73, at 209.
230. HARRYJAFFA, OmGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION: A
DISPUTED QUESTION 263 (1994).
231. GEORGE, THE CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES, supra note 7, at 78.
232. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted); see also GEORGE, THE CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES, supra note 7, at
155-56; RIcE, FIFTY QUESTIONS, supra note 76, at 23-25.
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D. Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide
The natural law analysis of the Court's end-of-life cases relies on the
same principle seen in the abortion context, namely that the direct killing
of an innocent human person is always immoral. 23 3 Traditional natural
law thinkers contend that any type of euthanasia or assisted suicide violates
this rule.2 3 4 Though Cruzan did allow states to apply "clear and convinc-
ing evidence . . . in [cases] where a guardian seeks to discontinue nutri-
tion and hydration of a person diagnosed to be in a persistent vegetative
state"-which can be construed as a narrow victory in the effort to protect
innocent human persons from lethal force-natural law criticisms can
nevertheless be made as to the Cruzan decision. 2 35
First, Cruzan stands for the proposition that states may validly mandate
a "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard for situations like the one
seen in that case, not that they must.236 Second, in Cruzan, the Court
assumed, without deciding, that substantive due process would guarantee
a person not in a persistent vegetative state the right to refuse food and
water.2 37 Thus, Cruzan allows for several important ways in which inno-
cent human life could be violated, in contravention of the natural law
teaching on murder.
In important respects, the Court's ruling in Glucksberg accords with
the traditional understanding of the natural law. In Glucksberg, the Court
held that states could validly proscribe assisted suicide.238 That portion of
the decision, which gave states maximum power to protect innocent
human life in the assisted suicide context, met the natural law require-
ments concerning murder. Because the Court left open the question of
whether states could constitutionally allow assisted suicide, however, Gluck-
sberg is arguably not a perfect decision according to natural law stan-
dards.239 The fact that Oregon has a statute, ratified by a popular
referendum, that permits assisted suicide makes this defect of Glucksberg all
the more acute. 240 Charles Rice echoes a common natural law criticism of
the Court's end-of-life cases:
233. For a review of natural law moral principles concerning murder, see
supra notes 218-22 and accompanying text.
234. See, e.g., HITrINGER, supra note 138, at 135-62; MAY, supra note 139, at
235-82; RICE, FiFv QUESTIONS, supra note 76, at 362-72.
235. See Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284 (1990); see also RICE,
THE WINNING SIDE, supra note 73, at 24-31.
236. For a summary of the holding of Cruzan, see supra notes 111-18 and ac-
companying text.
237. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
238. For a discussion of the holding of Glucksburg, see supra notes 119-24 and
accompanying text.
239. See RICE, THE WINNING SIDE, supra note 73, at 23-31.
240. See Herbert Hendin & Kathleen Foley, Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon:
A Medical Perspective, 106 MICH. L. REv. 1613, 1613-14 (2008); Joseph Cordaro,
Note, Who Defers to Whom?: The Attorney General Targets Oregon's Death with Dignity
Act, 70 FoRDHmM L. REV. 2477, 2477-78 (2002).
[Vol. 54: p. 247
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol54/iss2/2
2009] NATURAL LAW AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 279
Legalized abortion put the nation on a slippery slope to euthana-
sia, which is merely postnatal abortion. While the Supreme
Court held in 1997 that there is no "right to die," this decision is
pro-life only in a narrowly tactical sense. The "right to die" cases
confirmed that the Supreme Court allows the states to permit the
intentional killing of innocent persons.24 1
VI. THE DIVERGENCE OF NATURAL LAW THINKING
As has been shown, current natural law theorists, at least those who
follow in the path of Aquinas, are largely in agreement as to the morality
or immorality of the practices before the Court in its substantive due pro-
cess cases. There is wide disagreement, however, among those same think-
ers as to the proper answer to the following question: To what extent, if at
all, should ajustice of the Supreme Court use traditional natural law analy-
sis? This Article will examine a number of relevant responses given to this
question by natural law thinkers and then offer some reflections on this
intra-theory debate.
Aquinas argued that, practically speaking, it is better for a political
community to have a set of written laws than to leave all matters to the
adjudication of individual judges. 242 Hejustified his conclusion as follows:
First, because it is easier to find a few wise men competent to
frame right laws, than to find the many who would be necessary
to judge aright of each single case. Secondly, because those who
make laws consider long beforehand what laws to make; whereas
judgment on each single case has to be pronounced as soon as it
arises: and it is easier for man to see what is right, by taking many
instances into consideration, than by considering one solitary
fact. Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of fu-
ture events; whereas those who sit in judgment of things present,
towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of
cupidity; wherefore their judgment is perverted.243
For Aquinas, the natural law does not intrinsically bestow upon any-
one the authority ofjudgment.244 Russell Hittinger explains that, in Aqui-
nas's understanding, "[o]nce ... natural law is made effective in the form
of positive laws . . . the judge . .. must judge according to the dictates of
whoever has authority to make law.... [Otherwise, he] subvert[s] not only
justice as determined by positive law, but also the natural justice that the
positive law sought to make effective." 24 5 Thus, Aquinas contended that a
241. RUCE, THE WINNING SIDE, supra note 73, at 23.
242. See S.T. I-II supra note 166, at 53-55, q. 95, a. 1.
243. Id.
244. See HrrrINGER, supra note 138, at 76-77; S.T. I-II, supra note 166, at 5-7, q.
90, a. 3.
245. HII-rINGER, supra note 138, at 77.
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law can be illicit because of its author, "as when a man makes a law that
goes beyond the power committed to him." 246 Finally, in answering
"Whether he who is under a law may act beside the letter of the law?,"
Aquinas stated:
Wherefore if a case arise wherein the observance of that law
would be hurtful to the general welfare, it should not be ob-
served.... [Iff the observance of the law according to the letter
does not involve any sudden risk needing instant remedy, it is not
competent for everyone to expound what is useful and what is
not useful to the state: those alone can do this who are in author-
ity, and who, on account of such like cases, have the power to
dispense from the laws.
24 7
Currently, on one side of the spectrum sit those natural law juris-
prudes who do not think that the natural law should play any role in Su-
preme Court decision making. Robert Bork states his opinion on the
matter succinctly: "I am far from denying that there is a natural law, but I
do deny both that we have given judges the authority to enforce it and that
judges have any greater access to that law than do the rest of us." 248 Ac-
cording to Bork:
In a constitutional democracy[,] the moral content of law must
be given by the morality of the framer or the legislator, never by
the morality of the judge. The sole task of the latter-and it is a
task quite large enough for anyone's wisdom, skill, and virtue-is
to translate the framer's or the legislator's morality into a rule to
govern unforeseen circumstances. That abstinence from giving
his own desires free play, that continuing and self-conscious re-
nunciation of power, that is the morality of the jurist."249
Robert George shares a similar view. 250 He argues that the question
of whether judges may use the natural law in the adjudication of cases is
not decided by the natural law but rather by the positive laws that have
bestowed the power of judicial review upon judges in the first place. 25 1
Although he believes that the drafters intended that the Constitution em-
body principles of natural law and natural rights, George contends that
the document bestows upon Congress and the state legislatures the "pri-
246. S.T. I-II, supra note 166, at 70, q. 96, a. 4 (describing ways in which laws
may be unjust).
247. Id. at 73, q. 96, a. 6.
248. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 66.
249. Id. at 318.
250. See Robert P. George, Natural Law and Positive Law, in COMMON TRUTHS:
NEW PERSPEClIVES ON NATURAL LAw 151, 166 (Edward B. McLean ed., 2000)
("[S]ubject, perhaps, to one or two minor qualifications, I am prepared to believe
that [Bork's position] is sound.").
251. See GEORGE, THE CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES, supra note 7, at 180.
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mary authority for giving effect to natural law and protecting natural
rights." 25 2 In George's understanding, judges should stick to the "text,....
structure, logic, or original understanding" of the Constitution in making
decisions.2 53 What's more, George is not only critical of those times that
the Court, in going beyond the Constitution, has reached a substantively
unjust result. He asserts that "courts can usurp, and have usurped, legisla-
tive authority in good as well as bad causes. Whenever they do so, how-
ever, even in good causes, they violate the rule of law .... And respect for
the rule of law is itself a requirement of natural justice." 254
Russell Hittinger agrees with George that the theory of the natural
law cannot intrinsically answer the question of who is to enforce the natu-
ral law in a particular polity.2 55 He further contends that "there is nothing
contradictory in arguing . . . for a natural law basis of government, and
indeed positive law itself, while at the same time holding that judges
ought, whenever possible, to be bound by written law." 25 6 It is on this
basis that he takes to task those who "suggest that the existence of a natu-
ral right necessarily binds ajudge apart from any consideration of the pos-
itive law." 25
7
Hittinger does indicate, however, that there may be times when
judges can permissibly reference the natural law, insofar as they are discov-
ering the moral intent of a law and there is evidence that the drafters of
that law sought to affect a natural law or natural rights principle. 258 He
cites the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment as an example of
where judges might validly consider the natural law in interpretation. 2 59
Hittinger offers the following criteria for the use of the natural law in con-
stitutional adjudication:
First, claims about natural law require one to articulate which
actions are more or less essential to human personhood. Vague
rhetoric about "self-definition" is insufficient legally, politically,
and morally for determining what is due, by nature, to human
persons. Second, claims must be measured against the written
Constitution. Do they explicitly contradict the Constitution? If
so, then natural law is not being used to interpret, but rather to
reconstruct the Constitution. Third, the natural law claim must
be assessed in the light of judicial precedents in order to see
whether it fits, and whether it reasonably articulates a pattern of
judicial decisions. Fourth, the natural law claim ought to com-
252. See id. at 182.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See HITTINGER, supra note 138, at 69-70, 72.
256. Id. at 78-79.
257. Id. at 83.
258. See id. at 71-72, 90.
259. See id. at 88.
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port with the tradition and conscience of the people.... Ajuris-
prudential theory of natural law would have to guide judgments
about how strongly the natural law claim is congruent with these
four criteria.260
Harry Jaffa takes an interesting position on the question of whether
the natural law may be used by the Court.26 1 Like Bork and George, he is
"devoted to the principle that the justices of the Supreme Court are
bound unqualifiedly by the positive law of the Constitution, and that the
positive law of the Constitution is to be understood in terms of the original
intent of those who framed and those who ratified it."2 6 2 Jaffa departs,
however, from those two scholars in important ways. Jaffa contends that "a
genuine jurisprudence of 'original intent' ... would have to recognize the
principles of the Declaration of Independence as the principles of the
Constitution." 263 According to Jaffa, to suggest "[tihat judges should be
neutral interpreters of the law is one thing: but to say that the law itself is
essentially neutral-that it is mere process without purpose-is an-
other."264 ForJaffa, the philosophy of the Declaration is the philosophy of
natural right.2 65 Elsewhere, Jaffa explicitly refers to the "natural law and
natural rights doctrine of the Declaration."2 6 6
Further, Jaffa argues that the very words of the Constitution necessa-
rily presuppose the natural law.26 7 In his understanding, the American
people could not have rebelled against the United Kingdom and estab-
lished a wholly new government unless they were, by nature, created
equal. 268 Jaffa stresses that the authority of the people to do either action
was grounded in their natural rights. 269 Consequently, Jaffa contends that
natural law must exist in order for the Constitution, which was nominally
260. Russell Hittinger, Liberalism and the American Natural Law Tradition, 25
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 429, 498 (1990).
261. See generally Harry V.Jaffa, What Were the "Original Intentions" of the Framers
of the Constitution of the United States, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 351 (1987).
262. Harry Jaffa, Natural Law, the Constitution, and Robert Bork, in STORM OVER
THE CONSTITUTION: JAFFA ANswERs BoRK (1994), reprinted inJAFFA, supra note 11, at
39.
263. Harry Jaffa, The Closing of the Conservative Mind: A Dissenting Opinion on
Judge Robert H. Bork, in JAFFA, supra note 11, at 3.
264. Id. at 4.
265. See generally Thomas G. West, Jaffa Versus Mansfield: Does America Have A
Constitutional or a "Declaration of Independence" Soul?, 31 PERSP. ON POL. Sci. 235
(2002) (noting Jaffa's position that Constitution must be interpreted in light of
principles of Declaration of Independence).
266. HARRY V. JAFFA, A NEw BIRTH OF FREEDOM: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE
COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 84 (2000).
267. See generally JAFFA, supra note 11, at 3943.
268. See id. at 40-41.
269. See id. at 41 ("The origin of the authority of the people, taken as a whole,
lies in the fights with which each individual has been 'endowed by this] Creator'
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authored by the American people, to be legitimate. 2 70 Because the people
authorized the government, and the people are subject to the natural law,
the Constitution and the government it created must conform to the
precepts of the natural law. 2 71
In summary, Jaffa's view seems to be that the Court should use the
natural law in reaching its decisions, not because judges have authority to
go beyond the text of the Constitution or the will of those who drafted it,
but rather because natural law ideas are contained within the document
and the principles of the natural law animated the Founders. Responding
directly to the arguments offered by Bork and similar thinkers, Jaffa writes:
The natural law doctrines to which constitutional interpreters
ought to turn are not any that anyone might turn to, as Judge
Bork suggests. They are the principles endorsed by the genera-
tion that framed and ratified the constitution itself. The positive
law of the Constitution cannot be understood without them be-
cause they are the ground of that positive law.2 7 2
Charles Rice takes the position that, in certain limited circumstances,
the Court may look to the natural law in its adjudication. 2 73 In his ac-
count, a judge confronted with an unjust statute should first attempt to
remedy it through constitutional analysis. 274 According to Rice, this is
often a feasible solution, especially because there are several parts of the
Constitution that "incorporate natural law principles," including the due
process clauses.2 75
Nonetheless, Rice believes that if a judge is confronted with an injus-
tice that is condoned by the Constitution, he must appeal to the natural
law.27 6 Rice explains:
Judges are bound to follow the original intent, as far as it can be
determined, and they have no right to amend the Constitution
according to their own conception of natural law. But this re-
striction is subject to the fact that although it is the highest en-
acted law of the nation, the Constitution is itself a form of human
law and is therefore subject to the higher standard of the natural
law. That standard is supra-constitutional. It sets limits to what
the legal system, however it is structured, can do even through
constitutional provisions.27 7
270. See id. at 40-41.
271. See id. at 42.
272. Id. at 43. For some of Bork's criticisms ofJaffa, see Robert H. Bork, Mr.
Jaffa's Constitution, NAT'L REv., Feb. 7, 1994, at 61.
273. See RICE, FIFTY QUESTIONS, supra note 76, at 115-21.
274. See id. at 116.
275. See id. at 117.
276. See id. at 116-17.
277. Id. at 115.
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Rice is quick to point out that this extreme remedy of invalidating a statute
or precedent because it violates the natural law should only be used in very
rare cases.2 78 He cites Brown v. Board of Education,2 79 Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford,280 and Roe v. Wade as cases in which the Court could have legitimately
used the natural law in making its decision.
28 1
VII. REFLECTIONS
The question of whether natural law analysis may, or should, be em-
ployed by the Court in adjudication is a difficult one. Credible arguments
have been made by both sides in the debate. Nevertheless, the evidence
suggests that it is in the overall best interests of those who wish to promote
natural law principles to advance originalism, even though such a concep-
tion of constitutional interpretation does not allow for the employment of
natural law judicial reasoning. 282 While currently there does not seem to
be a perfect solution to this problem, originalism represents-from the
natural law perspective-"The Lesser Evil."'283 The desire to combat an
injustice through any means possible is certainly understandable. Appeal-
ing to the natural law certainly appears to be a proper way of ensuring that
goodness reigns in the polity. For prudential reasons, however, those who
want to see an America guided by natural law principles should refuse
judges the ability to utilize the natural law in deciding cases under the
United States Constitution.
278. See id. at 121 ("[J]udges should take this step only when the conflict be-
tween the law or precedent and justice is 'intolerable' or 'unendurable."').
279. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
280. 60 U.S. 393 (1856), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
281. See RICE, FIrT QUESTIONS, supra note 76, at 119-21. Rice contends, how-
ever, that a just ruling could have been arrived upon in Roe via normal constitu-
tional interpretation. See id. at 121. In his words, "one need not reach that conflict
on Roe, because the decision's denial of personhood to unborn human beings in-
correctly interprets the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.; see also Charles I. Lugosi,
Conforming to the Rule of Law: When Person and Human Being Finally Mean the Same
Thing in Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 119 (2006-2007)
(arguing that Fourteenth Amendment should provide protection for pre-born
human beings); Nathan Schlueter & Robert H. Bork, Constitutional Persons: An Ex-
change on Abortion, FIRST THINGS, Jan. 2003, at 28, available at http://www.first
things.com/article.php3?idarticle=424; Edward Whelan, Abortion & Justice: Let's
Hope John Roberts is a Genuine Moderate, NAT'L REv. ONLINE, July 22, 2005, http://
article.nationalreview.com/?q=NZE5ODdiZWNkMzMwMDmOWQ3MzJMDNIN
TkyY2E2Njc=#More.
282. See generally DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE
DEBATE OVER ORICINALISM (2005);JOHNATHAN O'NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN
LAw AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2007); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1998); ORIGINALISM: A QUAR-
TER-CENTURY OF DEBATE (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007).
283. SeeAntonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 864
(1989) ("The inevitable tendency ofjudges to think that the law is what they would
like it to be will . . . cause most errors in judicial historiography . . .so that as
applied .. .originalism will . .. end up as something of a compromise.").
284 [Vol. 54: p. 247
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To allow a justice to appeal to the natural law in making his or her
rulings is frankly a gamble. 28 4 Philip Hamburger makes the point that:
Natural rights and natural law are ideas that frequently seem to
have something in common with the elusive shapes of a Ror-
schach test. They are suggestive of well-defined, recognizable
images, yet they are so indeterminate that they permit us to see
in them what we are inclined to see. Like Rorschach's phantasm-
inducing ink blots, natural rights and natural law are not only
suggestive but also indeterminate-ideas to which each of us can
plausibly attribute whatever qualities we happen to associate with
them. For this reason, we may reasonably fear that natural rights
and natural law are ideas often used to legitimate what are, in
fact, our individual preconceptions and desires.
285
Natural law adjudication can have quite positive results, if the judge
properly grasps the true principles of the natural law. 28 6 Given the flawed
nature of humans, however, there is an equal if not greater chance that
the judge will misperceive the requirements of the natural law and natural
justice. Such misperception, coupled with broad interpretive power,
could have extremely deleterious consequences.
28 7
Stephen M. Krason argues that the solution to this dilemma is to ap-
point judges who subscribe to "the true natural law."288 This answer, how-
ever, is open to criticism. 289 According to Robert Bork:
The question of why most judges impose New Class attitudes is
simply answered. [The views of the New Class are in opposition
284. For example, despite the fact that all three authors concur that the fed-
eral Constitution needs a moral interpretation, vastly different analyses are offered
in HADLEY ARKES, BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION (1992); DAVID A.J. RicHARDs, TOLER-
ATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986); Ronald A. Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited,
34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982).
285. Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitu-
tions, 102 YALE LJ. 907, 907 (1993); see also Russell Hittinger, Distinguishing Between
Constitutional Art and Morals, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 567, 568 (1995) ("As every-
one knows, the idiom 'natural law' is subject to the most dissimilar, even contradic-
tory usages.").
286. See, e.g., EUGENE DAVIDSON, THE TIAL OF THE GERMANS: AN ACCOUNT OF
THE TwENTY-Two DEFENDANTS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL AT
NUREMBERG (1997).
287. See Robert P. George, Judicial Usurpation and Sexual Liberation: Courts and
the Abolition of Marriage, 17 REGENT U. L. REV. 21, 21 (2004-2005) ("Judicial power
can be used, and has been used, for both good and ill."); Russell Kirk, Natural Law
and the Constitution of the United States, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1036 (1994)
("Misunderstanding of natural law, or its misapplication, may work great
mischief.").
288. See Stephen M. Krason, Constitutional Interpretation, Unenumerated Rights,
and the Natural Law, 1 CATH. Soc. Sci. REx'. 20, 25-28 (1996) (suggesting that reli-
ance on natural law will result in beneficial decisions).
289. See, e.g., BORK, COERCING VIRTUE, supra note 16, at 9-10 (noting potential
tendency of judges to shift their views and attitudes).
285
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to those held by most if not all natural law thinkers.] Those atti-
tudes are congenial to them, and the adoption of such attitudes
is important to their reputations. Judges, having passed through
colleges and law schools, are themselves certified members of the
intelligentsia. The ideas and values of the New Class are part of
the furniture of most judges' minds and seem self-evident. Be-
yond that, the prestige of ajudge depends on being thought well
of in universities, law schools, and the media, all bastions of the
New Class.... Whether a judge deliberately caters to these or-
gans of the New Class or is unconsciously conditioned by praise
and criticism to behave in accordance with the class's tenets, the
effect is to move him to the cultural left.
290
From the natural law perspective, the main danger in nominating Su-
preme Court justices who have displayed a belief in "the true natural law"
is that, even if such candidates could be found and confirmed, their juris-
prudential views might be altered once they have taken their seats on the
Court.29 '
Perhaps the most striking example of how a Krason-like strategy
might go wrong is the case of Justice Anthony Kennedy.29 2 When Ken-
nedy joined the Court, he was thought to have a judicially conservative
legal philosophy and there was evidence of some anti-abortion creden-
tials. 293 Such an assessment suggested that Kennedy would be a justice
who would advance natural law interests, even if he would not explicitly
refer to the natural law in reaching his conclusions. In fact, however, Ken-
nedy has worked against the propagation of decisions that are in accord
with natural law principles: he was a member of the plurality in Casey and
wrote the majority in Lawrence.
For natural law adherents, the alternative approach, advocated by
Bork and George, of requiring judges to stick to the strict text of the Con-
stitution on matters envisioned by the Founders and leave any other ques-
tions of public policy to Congress and the state legislatures seems to be far
safer. 294 For believers in the Thomistic natural law, this methodology is
not supreme in the abstract. It would be a bad approach if, for instance, a
polity's constitution explicitly allowed abortion or slavery. Nevertheless,
290. Id. (explaining rationale for judges' shift towards more liberal
perspectives).
291. See generally MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE POLITICS OF SU-
PREME COURT CONFIRMATIONS (2d ed. 2007).
292. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, 4 + 1: And the 1 isJustice Anthony Kennedy, NAT'L
REV.,Jul. 30, 2007, at 18, 18-19 (describingjustice Kennedy's significance as swing
vote); Russell Hittinger, What Really Happened in the Casey Decision: Et Tu, Justice
Kennedy?, CRISIS, Sept. 1992, at 16, 17.
293. See, e.g., Jason DeParle, In Battle to Pick Next Justice, Right Says, Avoid a
Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2005, at Al.
294. See Russell Hittinger, Natural Rights and the Limits of Constitutional Law, in
COMMON TRUTHS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON NATURAL LAW, supra note 250, at 169-92.
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the amended United States Constitution is a basically just document, so
long as it is narrowly construed. 295 Denying justices the ability to appeal
to the natural law in their adjudication may well prevent some very good
developments from taking place, but such a policy ensures that the sub-
stantial harm a judge might cause by misinterpreting or misapplying the
natural law will not occur.
In other words, under the Bork-George approach, citizens know what
they are getting: a basically just system because the Constitution is a basi-
cally just document. If judges are allowed to use an abstract concept like
the natural law in deciding cases, the resulting system is far from certain
and has the chance of suffering from substantial injustices. Considering
how high the stakes can be in a case that reaches the Supreme Court,
natural law advocates cannot afford the risks inherent in allowing the jus-
tices the ability to look to the natural law in reaching their conclusion.29 6
295. See GEORGE, THE CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES, supra note 7, at 344 n.52; RICE,
THE WINNING SIDE, supra note 73, at 117.
296. Although, it must be acknowledged that other situations would certainly
call for different analyses and, possibly, different conclusions. Two salient cases
are Germany under Nazism and the Soviet Union under Communism. In Nazi
Germany, the regime routinely issued laws and other official government pro-
nouncements that, on their face, violated the most basic human norms. See gener-
ally ROLF-DIETER MULLER & GERD R. UEBERSCHAR, HITLER'S WAR IN THE EAST 1941-
1945: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 210 (Bruce D. Little trans., 2d ed. 2002); 3 NAZISM
1919-1945, 389-629 (J. Noakes & G. Pridham eds., 2001) (describing Nazi persecu-
tion ofJewish population); HARRY REICHER, HOLOCAUST LAw: MATERIALS AND COM-
MENTARY (forthcoming); Harry Reicher, The Day Evil Became the Rule of Law,
FORwARD, Sep. 23, 2005, at 13, available at http://www.forward.com/articles/2830
(describing Nuremberg Laws that were "the very antithesis of everything normally
connoted by the notion of law").
Conversely, in the Communist Soviet Union, the authorities perpetrated teri-
ble abuses against the population despite having a constitution, introduced by Sta-
lin in 1936, that on its surface fully accorded with liberal democracy. See ROBERT
CONQUEST, THE GREAT TERROR: A REASSESSMENT 79, 145, 262 (2008); RICHARD
PIPES, COMMUNISM: A HISTORY 97-100 (2003). The Bolsheviks, of course, did at
times promulgate quite odious laws and decrees. See generally STtPHANE COURTOIS
ET AL., THE BLACK BOOK OF COMMUNISM: CRIMES, TERROR, REPRESSION 14 (Jonathan
Murphy & Mark Kramer trans., 2004) ("From the 1920s to the 1940s, Communism
set a standard for terror to which fascist regimes could aspire."); RICHARD PIPES,
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION (1991); RICHARD PIPES, RUSSIA UNDER THE BOLSHEVIK
REGIME (1995).
In Hitler's Germany, attempts to appeal to the natural law to extricate the
country from its nightmare were quashed by the government. See Heinrich Rom-
men, Natural Law in Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court and of the Constitutional
Courts in Germany, 4 NAT. L.F. 1, 5 (1959). For the standard work on German
opposition to Nazism, see PETER HOFFMANN, THE HISTORY OF THE GERMAN REsIS-
TANCE 1933-1945 (Richard Barry trans., 3d ed., McGill-Queen's Univ. Press 1996)
(1977). After the Second World War natural law thinking experienced a renais-
sance, especially in Germany and Austria. SeeJohannes Messner, Note, The Postwar
Natural Law Revival and Its Outcome, 4 NAT. L.F. 101 (1959); Ernst von Hippel,
Note, The Role of Natural Law in the Legal Decisions of the German Federal Republic, 4
NAT. L.F. 106, 111 (1959) (noting that Germany's 1949 Bonn Constitution empow-
ered judges to consider "higher legal orders against the rule of mere positive law").
For one view on how natural law-minded judges in Nazi Germany might have re-
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It is granted that legislatures can also cause significant evil. It is eas-
ier, however, to correct a mistake made by a legislature than one made by
a court, especially the highest court in the land.2 97 The legislators who
advanced the unjust legislation can be replaced at election time with ones
who oppose it. New laws can be passed that correct the wrongful statute.
Skilled lobbyists may be employed to convince legislators of the benefits of
voting for morally sound legislation. Most importantly, natural-law-
minded citizens may directly contact their legislator, voice their concerns,
and urge him or her to do the right thing. A legislator may well react to
this pressure, even if it is for no other reason than re-election concerns. In
contrast, the Supreme Court only handles concrete "cases" and "contro-
versies." 298 Furthermore, the Court does not have constituents and is
often wary to overturn its previous cases under the doctrine of stare
decisis. 299
To summarize, it is in their own best interests for natural law propo-
nents to deny justices the ability to look to the natural law in adjudication
and to support the judicial approach advocated by Bork and George be-
cause such a strategy ensures that the judiciary will cause only a minimal
amount of harm. At the same time, it leaves a significant avenue for legis-
latures to do positive good. It is the safest way to realize an America
guided by natural law principles.
The record makes clear that Justice Black was mistaken when he used
"[substantive] due process" synonymously with "natural law."'3 0 0 Under a
traditional natural law analysis, one finds illicit many of the practices that
the Supreme Court has granted constitutional protection under the doc-
trine of substantive due process. Furthermore, most of the philosophical
presuppositions that are at work in the Court's substantive due process
cases clash directly with the fundamental tenets of natural law theory.
3 0
'
While traditional natural law theorists are largely uniform in their
moral condemnation of the actions given constitutional guarantees by the
substantive due process decisions, they disagree significantly about
whether, and to what extent, the Court may refer to the natural law in
making its decisions.3 0 2 Although there are good points made by each
sponded, see Russell Hittinger, Aquinas and the Rule of Law, in THE EVER-ILLUMINAT-
INC WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 198, at 116-17.
297. See Edward Whelan III, What It Says, NAT'L REV., Mar. 13, 2006, at 45,
available at http://www.eppc.org/publications/pubD.2538/pub-detail.asp.
298. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
299. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992)
(contending that "a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable").
300. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 513 n.3 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
301. For a further discussion of natural law and the Court's substantive due
process practices, see supra notes 190-241 and accompanying text.
302. For a summary of the dispute over whether judges should reference the
natural law when deliberating, see supra notes 242-81 and accompanying text.
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side in the intra-theory debate, the policy of denying judges this right-
and forcing them to stick to the strict text of the United States Constitu-
tion-is the most sound from a natural law perspective.
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